Statement by Deputy Permanent Representative Maria Zabolotskaya at a UNSC Briefing on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
Mr. President,
We have studied the semi-annual report of the President and Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT; Residual Mechanism) on the work of this structure, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General on options for transferring the functions of the IRMCT and storing its archives.
We are disappointed by the fact that none of the reports listed above contain information on whether residual functions are already ready for transfer, nor whether the necessary preparatory work has been carried out to that end, and if not – then why.
Moreover, the IRMCT President’s report once again leaves one with the impression that this is a permanent organ. Let us recall that this is not the case. The mechanism was established as a purely temporary structure, which long ago should have been closed down. With its bloated staff and budget of $60 million, the Mechanism’s ongoing existence seems absurd against the backdrop of a completely empty “judicial basket” and the UN80 Initiative encompassing all UN divisions.
Similar impression is created by the planned “cosmetic” reductions in budget and staff mentioned in the report. This is especially true given that the plans of IRMCT leadership are often significantly divorced from reality. So far, all we have seen, as compared to the data from last year's report, is cutting one position: from 234 to 233 people. Once again, we highlight the unadmissibility of the practice whereby, for some reason, staff members engaging with the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) are not included in the total the number of IRMCT positions, which is indicated in the relevant footnote of the report. The Council needs to be fully informed about the precise number of IRMCT staff members.
We have noticed that the continued application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter vis-à-vis the residual judicial functions is presented in the reports under consideration as something of a fait accompli. In this regard, we would like to stress that the feasibility of invoking the provisions of Chapter VII is the exclusive prerogative of the UN Security Council, not of the leadership of the Mechanism nor the Secretary-General. We firmly believe that the existence of the IRMCT has become too protracted, and at the current juncture, there is no objective need for its use. All residual functions, including judicial ones, can and should be handed over to the national level, and there is no need for any Chapter VII to ensure their subsequent implementation.
If States require technical assistance through the Office of the Prosecutor, we can consider sensible options for transferring this function to competent UN agencies together with a small number of experienced staff. We note the specific and detailed proposals in this regard which are set out in the Prosecutor's report.
On a separate note, we would like to caution against attempts to develop a sort of a “residual mechanism for the residual mechanism.” For some reason, the Secretary-General's report is inclining the members of the Security Council to consider this very concept. We would like to stress that such an option is unacceptable. The mechanism was established by the Council as a purely temporary structure. It has fulfilled its main functions and should be closed. We recommend that the Mechanism begin to consider practical measures to prepare precisely for that scenario. We remember how hastily the commission on investigation in Iraq was closed. The Council spent years listening to well-dressed men talking about the importance of its work and proposing various scenarios for preserving its functions, but then it was closed without a Council resolution through the efforts of the Office of Legal Affairs.
We would like to particularly highlight the premise that allegedly only an international judicial mechanism can guarantee the rights of convicted persons through the exercise of judicial functions. This has nothing to do with reality, which is best illustrated by the “track record” of the Mechanism itself. It has simply failed to fulfil those functions.
For example, the early release procedure is only used when the Mechanism urgently needs to shed responsibility for the imminent death of yet another seriously ill prisoner. The current report reveals another situation whereby a convict, whose name is not disclosed for some reason, died shortly after being granted “early release” by the Mechanism. Except for cases where prisoners are literally at death’s door, requests for early release are systematically rejected. Even when there are compelling humanitarian reasons to grant it.
What speaks volumes in this regard is the case of Serbian General Ratko Mladić, who is being held at the UN Detention Unit in The Hague. In 2024, the IRMCT President rejected his application for early release on humanitarian grounds or on provision to serve the remainder of his sentence in Serbia. At the same time, according to the general's relatives and Serb doctors, as of November, the prisoner's serious condition has worsened. He suffers from sharp fluctuations in blood pressure, constantly high blood sugar levels, atrophied muscle tissue in his lower limbs, and impaired motor function in his hands and fingers. Mr. Mladić is hardly able to hold his head upright. He has pressure ulcers on both feet. He has osteomyelitis on his left ankle. Due to low body weight and mandatory bed rest, the patient's kidneys are overwhelmed by the medication. His cognitive functions are deteriorating. As a result, Ratko Mladić is not always able to recognize the presence and specifics of his health problems and promptly seek medical assistance. His dementia is progressing: in memory tests he scored 4 points out of 48 (three years ago, he scored 15 points). At the same time, the prison hospital administration did not consent for an MRI to be carried out, although the last scan was taken as early as in 2022 and already showed degenerating nerve tissue and a worsening condition compared to 2018. A Serbian cardiologist who visited Ratko Mladić this past October never received the essential documents she requested from the prison doctors, including those on the functioning of his cardiac pacemaker. She was given only 15 minutes to examine the patient, which is evidently insufficient even for a cursory analysis of the situation.
Is this list of illnesses really not enough to accommodate the request for early release or to transfer to Serbia?
In light of the above, we demand that the Mechanism revisit its ruling regarding Ratko Mladić and transfer the general to Serbia to serve the remainder of his sentence or release him early on humanitarian considerations so that he could spend the rest of his life receiving adequate palliative care. Any other approach would not only be blatantly inhumane, but would also stand in stark contrast to how, for example, Mr. Kabuga was treated: his case was indefinitely terminated due to his health. We emphasize that full responsibility for any negative developments regarding Mr. Mladić will lie directly with the Mechanism and personally with the President thereof.
The monitoring of the enforcement of sentences is yet another residual function (among the so-called judicial ones) that the Mechanism has failed to perform.
We are aware that the United Kingdom, where Radovan Karadžić is serving his sentence, continues to ignore even the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) with regard to Serbian prisoners. According to information from the Mr. Karadzic’s relatives and lawyers, his rights are systematically restricted, including his right to medical care, despite chronic illnesses he has. Prison authorities continue to exert psychological pressure on the convict: in night time, the lights in his cell remain on, allegedly for surveillance purposes. Once again, we reiterate that depriving prisoners of sleep through the exposure to light or sound constitutes torture. In September this year, Mr. Karadžić was banned from receiving visits from Rade Stokić, a priest of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Civil society organizations view this as “physical and psychological terror” by London. According to lawyers, the gamut of psychological pressure measures applied to Karadžić may be aimed at driving him to suicide.
In addition, in November this year, the British media widely circulated reports on Karadžić's alleged complicity in organizing “sniper tourism” for foreigners during the siege of Sarajevo. At the same time, the prison administration is forcing Mr. Karadžić to wear a special attire designating those suspected of attempting to escape. This is despite his age. His lawyers worry that these factors may attract the attention of other prisoners, who may attack the former leader of the Bosnian Serbs out of revenge.
Six months ago, we brought the situation of Mr. Karadžić to the attention of the IRMCT president, urging her to duly perform her monitoring functions and organize a visit to the place of imprisonment to have an in-person conversation with the convict. However, the President once again chose to limit herself to engaging with the prison authorities. If the IRCMCT still takes London’s words at face value, then what is the point of such “monitoring” at all?
The situations we have described clearly illustrate the real value of the so-called “guarantees” for persons under the supervision of the Mechanism, provided for under its judicial functions. Against this background, the only option that can genuinely guarantee the most basic rights of prisoners is their prompt transfer to their countries of citizenship to serve the remainder of their sentences. And for the other residual functions, this very option is the most realistic one.
As far as we understand, Rwanda, for example, is fully prepared to accept individuals serving sentences or those who have already been released from prison. The Mechanism should engage in practical negotiations with that State on this matter.
The issue of archives is also no exception. Yet, we were dismayed by the proposals to finance preservation of archives through voluntary contributions. The question arises: Why was the issue of donations even raised? What prevented the completion of this work long ago through budget funds? The IRCMCT’s budget is still huge, and work on the archives did not start yesterday. Therefore, we request information about the exact amount of money that has already been spent on the work with the archives of the tribunals and on the Residual Mechanism itself, we also want to know specific reasons why this work has not yet been completed. We emphasize that it cannot go on indefinitely, and even more so, it cannot serve as justification for extending the life of the Mechanism itself. In view of the above, the archives need to be handed over “as is” in their current state, whether to the States concerned or to the UN Secretariat.
We are aware of the fact that there are States willing, inter alia, to accept all archives, and maintain them at their own expense. As far as we are aware, Rwanda could be such a country. For some reason, this information is not included in the report. We consider this option to be preferable. We are convinced that all archives should be open, as was the case with the archives of the Nuremberg Tribunal. And the archives of the Residual Mechanism need to be dealt with likewise. We do hope that this institution has nothing to hide.
Mr. President,
Next year, we are to conduct another review of the Mechanism's activities. This structure is approaching this milestone with dubious achievements, continuing to sabotage the UN Security Council's mandate of 2010 to wind down its activities, sluggishly imitating cuts in staff and budget. The upcoming review will not be yet another formality allowing for this bureaucratic structure to continue its existence.
The Residual Mechanism needs to be ready to conclude its operations by the time the review is conducted.
Thank you.
