Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation Vassily Nebenzia at a UN Security Council Meeting on non-proliferation
Madam President,
"We, the peoples of the United Nations, are determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". These are the words that the Charter of our Organization begins with. And one and a half weeks after its signing, the first and, we hope, the last use of nuclear weapons took place in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Thus began the nuclear arms race, the consequences of which are still being felt today. It took almost 25 years to find a way to tackle this challenge with the help of the NPT Treaty. And this year we are celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. In half a century of its existence, the NPT has established itself as one of the cornerstones of the modern world order, and its contribution to international peace and security cannot be overemphasized. The indefinite extension of the NPT, which was achieved back in 1995, attests to its high relevance and proves the fact that the Treaty meets the interests of all State parties, both nuclear and non-nuclear.
Madam President,
Recently, we have witnessed the breakdown of a number of internationally recognized non-proliferation and arms control mechanisms. We believe that the root cause of this is attempts by one State to dominate globally and impose its "rules" on the world community to the detriment of the interests of other States and international law. All multilateral agreements and mechanisms that impede such domination are declared "outdated and ineffective".
The starting point here is the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), one of the most important treaties for strategic stability. Last year, under the false pretext the USA withdrew from the Treaty on the Intermediate-Range Forces (INF Treaty). Right after that, flight tests of previously banned U.S. systems began. Our proposals to impose a moratorium on the placement of land-based intermediate- and shorter range missiles, including the establishment of a verification mechanism, are not only ignored by the USA and its allies, but even undermined. Such actions only confirm that the true causes of the INF “destruction” have nothing to do with Russia's stands and actions.
The lack of certainty about the fate of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is the matter of concern. An extension of the Treaty would be a reasonable step that would allow us to prevent further deterioration of the situation in the area of strategic stability; to avoid a complete collapse of monitoring and restrictive mechanisms in the nuclear and missile spheres; and gain time to discuss approaches to controlling new weapons and military technologies. You are misguided when urging Russia to extend the START Treaty. Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed to the USA to extend the START Treaty without any preconditions. No answer so far.
Madam President,
At the time, the "nuclear deal" with Iran was a great success in the sphere of non-proliferation. Five years ago, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian Nuclear Program (JCPOA) was elaborated and unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council in UNSC resolution 2231. That was an example of the effective addressing of the crisis that could have escalated into "hot" conflict. A breakthrough was achieved when the parties involved showed a genuine willingness to hear each other and to consider mutual interests. However, we see that this unique achievement of multilateral diplomacy is at stake today due to the US waiver of its international legal obligations under the UN Charter.
With the USA officially refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and deploying its nuclear weapons on the territory of some of its NATO allies, Washington, in its new doctrinal provisions, significantly lowers the "threshold" for the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, NATO countries continue the practice of so-called joint nuclear missions, which include elements of nuclear planning and trainings for the use of nuclear weapons involving representatives of non-nuclear states. This is a direct violation of article I of the NPT by the nuclear-weapon NATO members, and article II by non-nuclear States. The culmination of that string of targeted actions was military exercises organized earlier this month by the United States and its European allies with the goal to prepare for the launch of nuclear attack on the Russian Federation.
In order to ease artificially created tension and preserve opportunities for further strategic dialogue, a year and a half ago we proposed to Washington to confirm, and better strengthen, the Gorbachev-Reagan formula stipulating that there can be no winners in nuclear war and it should never be unleashed. No answer again.
Madam President,
We understand concerns of a number of non-nuclear States that are persistently demanding acceleration of the nuclear disarmament process. We have always considered this issue as one of our foreign policy priorities. However, it is clear that all factors of international security and strategic stability must be taken into account. Military actions undertaken by the United States and NATO in recent decades, as well as Washington's threats against a number of States, including Russia, only alienate us from the goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons.
There is a need for consistent evolvement of the prerequisites that would facilitate further progress towards nuclear disarmament. Above all, this implies a recovery of the strategic situation in certain regions and in the world as a whole. This is possible only with account of the full range of factors that have an impact on strategic stability and international security. These factors are the following: unlimited deployment of the U.S. global ABM system; development of high-precision strategic offensive weapons in non-nuclear equipment; prospects of deployment of strike weapons in space; undermining of system of international treaties and agreements on security, stability and arms control; and attempts to weaken defense capabilities of other countries through illegitimate methods of unilateral sanctions pressure in circumvention of the UN Security Council.
Without addressing these issues, we are unlikely to strengthen international security and advance nuclear disarmament.
Madam President,
Another crucial issue within NPT is the establishment of a Middle-East Zone free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and means of delivery, as stipulated in the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
We hope that Conferences on WMDF - the first one was held in November 2019 - will eventually lead to the desired result - the developing and signing by all countries of the Middle East of a legally binding agreement on WMDF. For our part, we have always facilitated and will continue to facilitate this process. It is important that the other 5NWS, and most importantly, all the countries of the Middle East, join these efforts.
Madam President,
We consider IAEA safeguards to be a key element of the non-proliferation regime. Their purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear energy for nuclear weapons. We are committed to assisting the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards system.
At the same time, it is crucial to preserve the impartial, depoliticized and technically reasonable nature of the NPT verification mechanism.
We believe that the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is an issue that all the parties to the NPT agree on.
Madam President,
It is now necessary to bring together all parties to the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear states, in order to alleviate confrontation. It is important to hold the 2020 Review Conference in such a way, that will contribute to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, rather than weakening it. It means, that the Conference should be held in the most non-confrontational manner as possible. As a minimum, parties should reiterate their common commitment to the Treaty and reaffirm the obligations they undertook in the course of earlier review cycles.
The Russian Federation is interested in maintaining and improving the nuclear non-proliferation regime and is ready to actively cooperate with all its participants for successful conduction of the 2020 Review Conference.
Thank you.
