Statements by Mr.Alexander Radovitskiy, the representative of the Russian interagency delegation, at the Fifth Session of the UN open-ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICTs 2021-2025
On the introduction of the draft annual progress report:
Mr.Chair,
Dear Colleagues,
Within the discussion on the draft annual report of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on security of and in the use of ICTs 2021-2025, I would like to start by making a general comment.
We are forced to state that the updated document, circulated by the Chair on 13 July 2023, has deteriorated significantly compared to the previous version. The imbalance in terms of the further development and implementation of the rules, norms and principles of responsible behavior of states, which we noted in the previous version, has only worsened. Our specific concerns on the text are reflected in the joint statement, delivered by the representative of Nicaragua on behalf of a group of like-minded countries.
We urge the Chair to review the draft report and ensure that the interests of all States involved in the process are taken into account in a balanced manner. The current version of the document will not garner consensus support. For our part, we express our continued readiness for constructive work on the text.
With regard to specific comments on the introduction, we insist on the need to bring it in line with the mandate of the OEWG.
Paragraph 4: It is unacceptable to reduce the Group's priority task of developing rules, norms and principles for responsible behavior of states to the idea of developing some kind of “common understanding” of security in the use of ICTs.
Paragraph 5: The language of the draft should be brought in line with the UNGA resolution 75/240. The term “stakeholders” (hereinafter in the text), respectively, should be replaced by “other interested parties”.
Paragraph 6: we consider the implementation of rules of responsible behavior to be the prerogative of states. Regional organizations could play a role in discussing the full range of ICT security issues.
Paragraph 7: The mandate of the OEWG does not include a discussion on gender issues. In this paragraph, it is more appropriate to reflect the pressing organizational aspects of the work: the urgent need to ensure in-person participation of all representatives of national delegations, as well as other interested parties accredited to the OEWG, in its official sessions and intersessional meetings held at the UN headquarters, through the timely issuance of visas.
Separately, I would like to dwell on paragraph 3. The statement that international law, in particular the UN Charter, applies to the field of ICTs misses an essential element of a longstanding compromise. I refer to the need for progressive development of international law, including the development of new norms of a legally binding nature. Relevant wording is enshrined in the reports of the groups of governmental experts (for example, the report of the GGE 2021, paragraphs 16, 72) and resolutions of the UN General Assembly (76/19, 77/36) and should be reflected in our document.
We will submit detailed proposals on the draft to the secretariat.
Thank you for your attention.
On agenda item “Organization of work”:
Mr.Chair,
Dear Colleagues,
We would like to express doubts about the need for holding an informal segment for non-governmental actors in the morning of July 26 (Wednesday). We believe that States’ priority task at the fifth session of the OEWG is to agree upon and adopt its second progress report. We envisage that delegates will have to work hard on the text. With a view to optimizing the negotiations it seems reasonable to reschedule the meeting with NGOs on July 28 (Friday).
As a gesture of goodwill, we will object the adoption of the programme of work proposed by Mr.Chair. At the same time, we propose to provide Ambassador Burhan Gafoor with flexibility in terms of a possible postponement of the abovementioned section for non-governmental actors, depending on the dynamics of the negotiations on the document.
Thank you for attention.
On existing and potential threats section:
Mr.Chair,
Dear Colleagues,
In our opinion, the section on existing and potential threats in the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) of the draft report requires significant improvement.
Paragraph 10: we consider a threat to information security of states the use of ICTs for purposes inconsistent with the objective of maintaining international peace and security. What is more, this can occur both during and outside conflicts. In addition, the meaning of the term “conflict” in this case is not clear.
Paragraph 10 bis: the mention of certain humanitarian organizations that are not part of critical infrastructure (CI) of states should be deleted. In addition, we believe that selective references to certain types of CI (marine and aviation) are unreasonable. In order to avoid listing all the areas that states consider critical, it is advisable to limit ourselves to mentioning the threat of computer attacks against information resources of states, including CII.
Paragraph 10 ter: to remove references to “electoral processes”, which are a part of political processes. Add the threat of interference in internal affairs of states to this paragraph.
Paragraph 10 quater: mentioning the impact of vulnerabilities and harmful hidden functions on international peace and security is redundant, since this contradicts the understanding enshrined in norms i and j of the GGE 2015 report. In addition, it is advisable to break this paragraph into several semantic blocks: 1) on the issue of data security and disinformation, 2) on harmful hidden functions and threats to supply chains, and 3) on the threat of the use of ICTs for criminal purposes, including specific instruments.
Paragraphs 14 and 21: the issues of artificial intelligence and quantum computing do not fall within the mandate of the OEWG, they are discussed at other specialized platforms under the auspices of the UN and beyond.
Paragraph 15: Gender issues also fall out of the scope of the OEWG’s mandate and do not have a significant impact on international information security. As a compromise, a single mention of the participation of women delegates in the sessions of the OEWG in the preamble could be retained.
Paragraph 17: needs significant revision. The obligations of states can be based solely on the norms of international law, and not on voluntary rules of behaviour, and even less so on confidence-building measures. Therefore, this paragraph should be supplemented with a reference to possible future legally binding norms. In addition, given the high degree of politicization of information security issues by certain states and their inclination to subjectively interpret the rules of responsible behavior, to impose sanctions for alleged non-compliance, we suggest emphasizing in this paragraph that the application of the rules of behaviour should not lead to escalation of tensions.
From the very beginning of the activities of the OEWG, Russia has repeatedly proposed to reflect an updated list of threats in the documents of the Group. Unfortunately, many of our proposals are still not reflected in the draft report:
– the use of information resources under the jurisdiction of another state without the consent of the competent authorities of that state;
– unsubstantiated accusations by some states against other states of organizing and committing wrongful acts with the use of ICTs, including computer attacks;
– unreasonable and deliberate inclusion of undeclared capabilities by ICT developers, as well as concealment by manufacturers of information about vulnerabilities in their products, which are used by certain states to conduct covert intelligence and total surveillance of users around the world;
– monopolization by individual states and / or with their assistance by private companies of the ICT market by limiting the access of other states to advanced ICTs and increasing their technological dependence on the states dominating in the field of information, increasing the digital divide;
– use of ICT as a coercive measure, including by limiting the access of developing states to technology.
In addition, the current version of the report does not include basically any measures to respond to existing and potential threats. We consider it necessary to supplement the section with proposals made by states on preventing the manipulation of information flows and the spread of hate speech; countering the deployment of tools for conducting computer attacks in free access; preventing unlawful restrictive measures against certain states, including against the freedom of information and the media, as well as discriminatory policy against private companies. We could also include other measures as contained in the Chair’s summary of the first OEWG of 12 March 2021.
Thank you for your attention.
First reply:
Mr.Chair,
Dear Colleagues,
I am forced to take the floor with regard to the unfounded anti-Russian statements made during the session. This is yet another attempt to disrupt the work of the OEWG, to deprive the delegations and the Chair of precious time, which we need more than ever to agree on a balanced report. We consider such tricks outrageous and disrespectful to all participants of the process.
Distinguished Mr. Chair, I appeal to you. The Russian delegation is ready to give a detailed response to the insinuations that have been addressed to us. I assure you that we have many more reasons for accusatory rhetoric. Nevertheless, we respect you, Mr. Chair, and all the participants of the negotiation process, and our joint work. Therefore, we will not allow ourselves to be drawn into a politicized debate.
We call on all delegates to maintain a professional and constructive approach for the benefit of successful and efficient work of the OEWG. Distinguished Mr. Chair, if such anti-Russian rhetoric is repeated, the Russian delegation reserves the right to reply.
Thank you for your attention.
Second reply:
Mr.Chair,
Dear Colleagues,
The Russian Federation is forced to take the floor again in order to respond to the anti-Russian statements that have been made.
As I have already pointed out, such – albeit extremely pathetic – attempts to politicize the discussion are a demostration of disrespect for the ongoing work within the OEWG, the mandate of the Group and the participants of the negotiation process.
The Russian delegation vehemently rejects the insinuations around Ukraine. We recommend that NATO countries and all those who obediently fulfill the ideological guidelines of Washington and Brussels think about their role in what is happening. You became accomplices of the criminal "Kiev regime", stained your hands in the blood of civilians who die every day from NATO shells. My colleagues at the specialized UN platforms will give you a more elaborate answer.
As for the use of ICTs, it is hypocritical to portray Ukraine as a victim of the so called "cyber aggression". Russia is systematically subject to computer attacks from the territory of this state. This includes DDoS attacks, theft of personal data, content spoofing in the media. It is quite indicative that those who operate under the guise of the Russophobic rhetoric of the “Zelensky regime” are mainly swindlers, acting in their own selfish interests. Thus, according to the statistics of one of the largest Russian banks, 80 out of 100 cases of telephone fraud are of Ukrainian origin.
We cannot fail to note in this regard the support provided to Ukraine by the NATO countries. Under the pretext of strengthening its "cyber security", entire units are sent to this country to train and coordinate the actions of hackers attacking the Russian information infrastructure. Ironically, in the near future, cybercriminals raised by the US and its allies will begin to rob the taxpayers of patron countries. According to our data, this trend has already emerged.
Separately, I would like to express surprise at the public rhetoric of the authorities of the NATO countries in defense of a free and democratic ICT environment. Your words, as usual, run counter to deeds. A month ago, US lawmakers accused the FBI of forcing Google and META – at the prompting of the "Kiev regime" – to block the accounts of users allegedly involved in pro-Russian propaganda. This is a flagrant violation of human rights and freedoms. And in the case of American citizens it is also of violation of the holy of holies of the US legislation – the First Amendment to the Constitution.
Summing up, I would like to recommend the governments of the countries whose delegations made Russophobic statements today to carefully study their policies in the digital environment from a legal and ethical perspective before voicing assessments of actions of other states.
Thank you for your attention.
