Statement by Dmitry Glukhov at a UNSC Arria-Formula Meeting on Small Arms Control and Weapons Management in UN Sanctions Regimes
Mr. Chairman,
We are grateful to you and our colleagues from Algeria, Guyana and Somalia for convening today's meeting. We thank Deputy to High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Adedeji Ebo, arms expert, Savannah de Tessieres, African Union High Representative for Silencing the Guns, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, and CARICOM Assistant Director, Callixtus Joseph, for their briefings.
The issues of control over supplies of conventional arms and military products, including small arms and light weapons, remain topical. Such problems as diversion of weapons, illicit trade thereof and acquisition by criminals and terrorists are still pertinent and are commonplace in conflicts in all regions across the globe. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are the most broadly used weapons, and it is their military use that causes the greatest number of human casualties, including among civilians.
Despite the efforts undertaken by international community at the national, regional, and global levels, we are compelled to state that these efforts are often insufficient. Some States still have overly loose legislation, and there are loopholes in export control regimes. International transfers of SALW are often made to non-State actors that do not have proper authorizations from their governments. Seeking profits or sometimes for purely political reasons, SALW suppliers do not care about where, by whom and for what purposes such weapons are going to be used. This indiscrimination is particularly characteristic of States that have excessive stockpiles of SALWs, and selling these weapons out would be a profitable alternative to disposing of them.
Given the topic proposed by our Sierra Leonean colleagues for today's meeting concerning the UNSC sanctions regimes, it is worth mentioning another problem – SALW manufacturing under expired licenses or without any licenses from the countries that own the technology. As a rule, weapons manufactured that way are exported to third countries, and cases of such transfers are carefully covered up. Due to this lack of transparency, SALWs end up in the hands of those who are subject to UNSC arms embargoes.
Given all these challenges, the Russian Federation has consistently paid great attention to control over supplies of military equipment, including SALW. Our country has consistently strengthened national legislation in this area and we are ready to share experience with other States concerned. We fully support the relevant initiatives in Africa and Latin America.
At the same time, my country is convinced that it is the States that must have the prerogative to manage and trade SALWs, define standards for ensuring their physical security, their marking, record-keeping, keeping inventories, and deciding on methods and technologies to manage surpluses of weapons.
Mr. Chairman,
What came to our notice is that the concept note for today's meeting, as well as the statements by some colleagues, contained references to the International Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). In our view, this instrument is extremely weak – it simply does not allow us to fully address the tasks stipulated in it. Let us take for example the fact that in the ATT there are no direct prohibitions on the unlicensed manufacturing of weapons and the transfer of weapons to non-State actors, nor are there any provisions on regulating the reexport of military products. In essence, there are still gaps, and persistent risks of weapons falling into the hands of organized criminal and terrorist groups.
And the implementation of the ATT, to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired. Some of ATT participants are not stopping direct or indirect supplies of arms and other military equipment to conflict zones. Therefore, we deem it unnecessary to refer to this instrument, since it not only fails to reflect reality but also allows for loose interpretation.
Thus, the ATT provisions appear to require further fine-tuning.
Mr. President,
We regret that the delegation of the Republic of Korea decided to use the event to disseminate groundless and off-topic accusations against my country. We categorically reject them. On numerous occasions, the Russian Federation has refuted such insinuations within the UN Security Council, and I’m not going to repeat what we have already stated for the sake of time. If you wish, you can familiarize yourselves with our statements.
Turning back to the topic of our meeting, we believe that there is a need to focus the efforts of the international community on what will be truly effective in terms of curbing illicit trafficking in SALW. The Russian Federation has consistently proposed in specialized fora a number of specific steps in this regard. Among them, we would like to briefly list the following. The first step is to impose a universal ban on transferring all types of SALW to actors not authorized by the Governments of recipient States; the second step is to make sure that States exercise strict regulation and direct control over broker activities related to arms exports in territories under their jurisdiction; the third step is to make an end-user certificate mandatory for arms export deals; and the fourth one is to prevent the production of SALW under expired licenses or without a license from the country that owns the technology, which includes curbing the practice whereby weapons previously manufactured under license are slightly modified without the manufacturer’s consent to be subsequently exported as proprietary designs.
Our country has always advocated the continued discussions on the UN platform on these and other matters pertaining to SALW. Of particular importance here is the implementation of the only specialized global document on combating illicit trafficking in these types of weapons – the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA). We believe it’s important to step up our joint efforts within the UNGA and the PoA. As regards the Security Council – in particular, its specialized sanctions committees – it should consider (when necessary), specific instances of violations of arms embargoes imposed by the Council on certain countries. We are open to cooperation on these issues with all constructively-minded States.
Thank you.
