Statement by the Representative of the Russian Federation Mr. Mikhail Kondratenkov at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards
Mr. Chair,
Effective operation of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime plays a key role in maintaining international peace and security.
The IAEA safeguards system, which is pivotal for strengthening the NPT and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, is one of the key elements of this regime. It is essential that the safeguards system be trusted by all States parties to the Treaty. To secure confidence, it should be impartial, politically unbiased, technically reliable and sound. Failure to meet these criteria, as well as any attempts to politicize the IAEA safeguards can severely impair both the NPT verification regime and the nuclear non-proliferation in general.
Russia closely follows the situation around the reform of the IAEA safeguards system, which continues to cause our serious concerns. We are still expecting the IAEA leadership's comprehensive report on the State-level concept clearly stating all the parameters of the reform, the procedure for applying the new approaches, the obligations and rights of the IAEA Secretariat and Member States. We would like to remind that this report should be presented to the Agency's Board of Governors for consideration and approval. We emphasize that the reform of the IAEA safeguards system is an essential matter of the NPT verification, and it concerns, in one way or another, all States parties to the Treaty.
We note the significance of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement for ensuring confidence in the peaceful nature of all nuclear material in the countries and the countries' nuclear activities. At the same time, it is our firm belief that concluding such additional protocols remains a voluntary step.
Russia supports the IAEA's efforts to ensure resilience and improving the efficiency of the NPT verification mechanism. We have contributed funding and expertise to this work, including through the Russian programme of support for IAEA safeguards.
Mr. Chair,
Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), directly envisaged by Article VII of the NPT, play an important role in ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Russia has always supported efforts to expand the geographic scope of such zones. It has ratified all the protocols on negative security assurances to the treaties establishing NWFZs that it has signed. Russia's reservations to the mentioned protocols serve the purposes of clarity and do not affect the interests of States who follow the "letter and spirit" of NWFZ arrangements in good faith.
Such clarifying reservations have been wholly justified, as the situation around the United States', United Kingdom's and Australia's AUKUS deal has demonstrated: one cannot exclude the possibility that as a result of this partnership nuclear-weapon States create their military infrastructure and, in the future, nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga.
Russia has consistently supported efforts to establish a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD-free zone) in the Middle East as envisaged by the resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Such a zone would serve as an effective means of strengthening regional stability and the nuclear non-proliferation regime for the benefit of all the States of the Middle East without exception. As an observer State, Russia contributes to the annual UN Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone. It is vitally important to ensure the engagement of all the invited States in the work of the Conference.
Mr. Chair,
Russia has consistently supported addressing nuclear non-proliferation challenges exclusively through political and diplomatic means, in strict compliance with the norms of international law and taking into account the legitimate security and development interests of all States.
The deep stagnation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme has been induced by the US and EU states that first violated UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and then disrupted the process of the revival of the 'nuclear deal'. The moves of these countries lead to further aggravation around Iran and its nuclear activities, fuelling instability in the Middle East. Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear activities is enshrined in the NPT as the country is a party to the Treaty and strictly complies with its obligations. External threats of use of force, not to mention the realization of such disastrous scenarios, inevitably lead to escalation and crisis. We firmly believe that a lasting settlement with regard to Iranian nuclear programme can only be achieved based on negotiated decisions.
Mr. Chair,
Russia's withdrawal of its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) came as a response to the disparity of approaches to the Treaty that had been incited by Washington's destructive stance for many years. As far back as 1999, the United States Congress denied to ratify the Treaty under invented pretexts. Since then, Washington has made no practical steps in this regard.
Russia remains a CTBT signatory state. Russia is still committed to the CTBT, which it demonstrated in late 2023 having completed the national segment of the International Monitoring System, a key component of the Treaty's verification mechanism.
Mr. Chair,
Russia supports launching negotiations based on the principles set forth in the 1999 document CD/1299 (the 'Shannon mandate') to elaborate a universal, non-discriminating, and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), at the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, we believe that today the idea of such a treaty has become to a considerable extent obsolete. However, we will be ready to participate in negotiations on its development should such a decision be adopted.
We see that the FMCT, if it is ever to be elaborated, should aim at providing reliable guarantee that fissile material for nuclear weapons will not be produced globally. This is the only way to ensure the compliance with the principle of equal and indivisible security for all.
Mr. Chair,
Russia attaches great importance to the implementation of Article III para 2 of the NPT. We believe that the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee have demonstrated that there is practical possibility of establishing an agreed non-discriminating procedure of nuclear export controls. Russia arranges its national export control system in accordance with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254). Russian legislation, including control lists, has been fully harmonized with this document. Regular updates are made to reflect the relevant changes made.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
