Statement by Representative of the Russian Federation Andrei Belousov in the First Committee of the 74th session of the UNGA on cluster 3 Outer Space (disarmament aspects)
Mr. Chairman,
Space is our common heritage. The future of individuals & humanity as a whole depends on how we manage our achievements in the exploration of near-Earth space and beyond. On the one hand, new horizons, which previously seemed incomprehensible, are opening up for us to address the existing problems.
On the other hand, we cannot but note the progressive aggravation of the situation in the field of security of space activities. Since the beginning of 2019, a number of events have taken place that require reflection and reaction by the international community. A number of countries have already announced plans to deploy Strike Weapons Systems in outer space. That was done officially through the adoption of national doctrinal documents.
The updated review of U.S. Missile Defense Policy Review sets the task of deploying an entire echelon of ballistic missile interceptors. I think everybody understands that these capabilities can have the widest range of application, including space and ground targets, depending on the target designation. The rest is as they say to be a technical matter. France has adopted its "space defence strategy" and I would like to stress that it is the first document of this kind in the world. The strategy not only declares outer space a "cornerstone of defence", but also provides for measures to "actively protect" its satellites from unfriendly or hostile actions.
The arguments used to justify such actions are extremely shaky. They refer to the need of protecting national or group space assets, improving security of satellite constellations, and ensuring space-related national or bloc vital interests. There are speculations of a growing external threat that cannot be eliminated without the deployment of "active defence" systems in outer space, which, as we see, are Strike Weapons Systems.
Let's focus on some provisions. U.S. documents, including special military directives, provide for the possibility of taking preemptive and anticipatory measures in space, and not only to protect U.S. space property, but also the interests of their commercial companies and even individuals. Thus, the U.S. National Space Strategy adopted in March 2018 explicitly recognizes space as a “Warfare Domain”. The continuation of Washington's policy to ensure the "leadership in space" does not contribute to a constructive dialogue on the issues of strategic stability.
As we said earlier, the new U.S. Missile Defense Policy Review published on January 17 aims at creating a space-based missile defense group, including interceptors. This is another confirmation (along with the decision to establish Military Space Force and allocate funding for the development of space-based missile defense systems) of the essence of Washington's plans to use outer space in the near future to ensure the "American leadership in space". The set up of the U.S. Space Command as well as active efforts of Washington to make Space Forces a separate type of the Armed Forces fit in the same category. In this regard, it is appropriate to recall the ABM Treaty, from which the United States withdrew unilaterally in 2002. The point is that Article V of the ABM Treaty contains an explicit ban on the deployment of missile defence systems or components in outer space. No comment is needed, as they say.
Moreover, U.S. colleagues prefer to ignore the direct relationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, as stated, in particular, in the 2010 New START Treaty. Nor do they recall the sad experience of Washington's previous attempts to gain military superiority, which invariably resulted in increased international tensions and new arms races.
Having secured its "freedom of hands" the United States has begun to build up its military and space potential. Capabilities to counteract "hostile influence" on foreign spacecraft are being actively developed. At the same time, the U.S. constellation of military satellites including those capable of maneuvering in near-Earth space, is several times larger than the Russian one. Moreover, Washington continues to register its spacecraft exclusively as meteorological or communication satellites, but not as military ones. Finally, let us not forget that the U.S. has anti-satellite weapons, as well as the experience of its actual use.
These steps, as well as statements by the U.S. authorities about the intention to deploy weapons in space, reveal the true reasons for the many years of active opposition of the U.S. and its allies to multilateral efforts to develop and conclude a multilateral legally binding instrument and promote initiatives aimed at maintaining space for peaceful purposes and studies. Unfortunately, U.S. representatives cynically continue "megaphone diplomacy" in specialized multilateral fora, making purely rhetorical and baseless allegations against other States and thereby trying to divert attention from their own unfair activities in this area. At the same time, the U.S. does not propose any specific initiatives to address these concerns, preferring unconstructive criticism to a meaningful dialogue.
The bad example of the United States has been contagious. We have to state that France has also announced its plans to deploy weapons in outer space. In its “Space Defence Strategy” adopted this July, Paris sets forth its policy aimed at building “Active Space Defence” capabilities that would include Space-Based Strike Weapons Systems. NATO is preparing a similar document, scheduled for adoption during the alliance summit in the end of this year.
It all looks like a declaration of undivided and uncontrolled domination of the Western countries in outer space, which would enable them to shape under the threat of use of force the framework for relations and the way of interaction not only on near-Earth orbits, but also on Earth itself. It is already clear that the implementation of the intentions to deploy weapons in near-Earth space will have catastrophic consequences for international security and strategic stability. This is fraught with further deterioration of trust between States, growing tension, emergence of new threats and challenges, undermining fundamental agreements in the field of the use of outer space and reducing the predictability and sustainability of space activities.
Russia, together with its like-minded countries, seeks to prevent an arms race in outer space provoked by Western countries. Over the last years, we have been proposed a number of initiatives to address the issue of PAROS. The key one is the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects (PPWT) under consideration of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Unfortunately, due to the unwillingness of a number of countries led by the United States to demonstrate political will and ability to reach a compromise for strengthening international security, it has not yet been possible to begin substantive work in the CD on this document.
We commend the work of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts in preparing recommendations on elements of a multilateral legally binding instrument on PAROS, including the prevention of placement of weapons in outer space. The experts prepared a qualitative report containing many useful developments. Unfortunately, as you know, the adoption of this report was blocked at the last moment by the United States representative. It’s worth nothing that he could not even provide any clear explanation for this step. In our view, this is yet another confirmation of the true intentions of the United States to weaponize outer space.
Given the GGE outcomes, we propose at this UNGE session to adopt a resolution “Further practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space”, stressing high value of the GGE activities.
For this session of the First Committee, we have also prepared a draft of the UNGA resolution on "No first placement of weapons in outer space". This resolution should be considered as a UN traditional document, which has been adopted annually by the General Assembly on the initiative of three original co-authors – Russia, Brazil and China since 2014. Its goal is to help mobilize the international community in support of multilateral NFP (no first placement of weapons in outer space) initiative/political commitment proposed as early as 2004 and it doesn’t undermine the national interests of the UN member-states. Over the past year, three other states joined it – Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Cambodia. This brings the total number of full-fledged participants to 22.
Finally, we are introducing the already traditional draft resolution of the UNGA "Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (TCBMs)", which has been adopted without a vote since 2013 and co-sponsored by Russia, China and the United States. However, times have changed, and the United States not only gave up its co-sponsorship last year, but without any reason radically revised its position on this document by voting "against" it. This is particularly eloquent in the context of this year's failed session of the UN Disarmament Commission, where one of the agenda items is the issue of TCBMs.
We expect that our draft resolutions on space-related issues will receive broad support and co-sponsorship.
Thank you for your attention.
