Statement by the Representative of the Russian Federation Andrei Belousov in the First Committee of the 74th session of the UNGA within thematic debate on “Nuclear Weapons”
Distinguished Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues,
Ridding the world of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons, is a key priority of Russian foreign policy. The Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the defining international legal instrument in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament remains fundamental to reaching this goal.
On 5 March 2020, we will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT, and in a couple of months, in April and May, its anniversary Review Conference will be held. We attach particular importance to the successful completion of the current review cycle. We are ready to cooperate actively with all partners in order to overcome the remaining contradictions on key issues and the problems facing the international community that hinder further strengthening of the Treaty regime. In that context, we emphasize that it is imperative that all the decisions adopted in the past NPT review cycles be implemented.
We attach particular importance to the issue of the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other WMD (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. This topic is now one of the most discussed topics within the NPT. We believe that the resolution of this issue is in the interests of all countries in the region and will facilitate strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia intends to participate in the WMDFZ Conference (New York, 18-22 November 2019) and contribute to its successful outcome. We consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a key instrument of the NPT regime and constitutes an effective measure in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The objective of the CTBT is to effectively constrain the development of nuclear weapons, as well as to establish a barrier to the qualitative and quantitative improvement of nuclear weapons.
The Russian Federation confirms that it remains committed to the CTBT. Its early entry into force will undeniably be a significant input into strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and its proper functioning. We call upon the States, first and foremost from Annex II, to intensify focused efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the CTBT. We call upon the United States to change its attitude towards the Treaty and to revisit the issue of its ratification before the 2020 NPT Review Conference.
The commitment of the Russian Federation to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world has continuously been translated into concrete practical actions. Indeed, within the chosen course the Russian Federation has taken a number of consistent and significant steps to reduce and limit nuclear weapons. As a result, Russian nuclear arsenal has been reduced by more than 85 percent over the last thirty years. We have fully complied with and strictly abide by all our relevant treaty obligations within the framework of bilateral agreements in this field.
Mr. Chairman,
The current session of the UN General Assembly runs in an extremely challenging environment. The world is witnessing growing trends that have negative implications on international security and stability. Nuclear arms control is affected by manifestations of the crisis as well. All this constitutes a serious challenge to the international community.
Once again, we note with deep regret and concern that one of the key disarmament agreements, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), was terminated after the U.S. withdrawal from it under spurious pretexts. We are not going to dwell in detail once again on the substance of the crisis surrounding this Treaty and the true causes of the U.S. actions aimed at destroying it. All this is described in full in the written version of the Russian statement distributed during the general debate. However, we believe it is important to recall that the long-standing problems regarding the U.S. compliance with this agreement remain unresolved and their consequences continue to have a negative impact on international security and stability even after the termination of the Treaty.
At the same time, we strongly reject absolutely unfounded allegations of
Russian “violation” of the INF Treaty. The experts in this room are well aware that not a single evidence of the Russian “non-compliance” with the Treaty has ever been presented to Russia. In this regard, we demand that those countries that on the eve of today’s discussion allowed themselves to make accusations against Russia in the room of the First Committee, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Estonia and Sweden on behalf of the Nordic countries as well as in its national capacity, immediately present objective data to confirm their statements or stop propagating blatant misinformation. The same refers to any country that might consider it possible to replicate slanderous accusations against Russia in the context of the INF Treaty.
Furthermore, we reject the allegations made in the statement by the EU representatives and some Western countries that Russia has supposedly "failed to respond adequately to serious concerns" in relation to the alleged non-compliance with the Treaty. It's totally untrue. Representatives of these countries are well aware of the relevant unilateral transparency measures implemented by Russia in an attempt to preserve the INF Treaty. They are also aware that we have proposed to the U.S. side a set of specific and realistic mutual transparency steps aimed at resolving mutual claims related to the Treaty. However, our initiative was rejected without any consideration.
The Russian Federation being a responsible member of the international community seeks to prevent any new missile crises. We have unilaterally declared and will implement the moratorium on the deployment of ground-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in any regions until the U.S. missiles of a similar type begin to appear there. We call on the U.S. and its allies to take similar reciprocal steps and on all other countries to support our efforts to prevent a new round of a dangerous missile arms race in various regions of the world.
We note with concern that prospects for the New START Treaty, which expires in less than 18 months, continue to be unclear. We have repeatedly expressed our readiness to address in a serious manner all issues related to possible extension of this agreement. In the current circumstances, this would be a reasonable step that would prevent the situation in the area of strategic stability from complete deterioration and would buy time to explore possible approaches to new emerging weapons and military technologies.
However, the American side does not rush to reveal its position on this crucial international issue. Moreover the U.S. officials are publicly discussing the inexpediency to extend the Treaty. It seems that the United States would prefer to get rid of the restrictions under this Treaty, as it has already done with the ABM and the INF treaties. We believe that such an approach is counterproductive and fraught with serious threats to international security and stability.
One of the most serious challenges in the nuclear field remains NATO's socalled "nuclear sharing", which combine nuclear planning with nuclear weapon use exercises involving carrier aircrafts, flight crews, airfields and land-based support units belonging to non-nuclear-weapon NATO members. The Russian Federation has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that such practice, which is destabilizing in its nature, directly contradicts the spirit and letter of the key Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the overwhelming majority of the members of the international community are parties.
Mr. Chairman,
The Russian Federation has reaffirmed on many occasions, including at the highest level, its readiness to consider possible future steps in the area of nuclear disarmament. Progress in this direction should be carried out in strict accordance with the Article VI of the NPT in the context of general and complete disarmament and on a step-by-step basis. In implementing practical measures to reduce and limit nuclear weapons and diminish their role in military planning, precedence should be given to the principle of indivisible security.
Consistent efforts are needed to lay the groundwork for progress towards nuclear disarmament. First and foremost, this means improving the strategic situation in certain regions and in the world as a whole. For this reason the Russian Federation insists that nuclear disarmament cannot be dissociated from the host of factors that have a negative impact on strategic stability.
In particular, we must vigorously oppose attempts to weaken the decades-old disarmament architecture while ensuring that the credibility of international organizations and arms control regimes is not undermined. Attempts to weaken the defence capacity of other countries through the illegitimate practice of imposing unilateral sanctions bypassing the United Nations Security Council are unacceptable.
We should take into account the destabilizing consequences of unilateral and unfettered actions to deploy a global missile defence system and make every possible effort to prevent the weaponization of outer space and a new arms race driven by technological advances, as well as the growth of quantitative and qualitative imbalances in the field of conventional weapons. Without addressing these problems it is unlikely to achieve the international security situation that is conducive to further steps towards nuclear disarmament.
The growing number of challenges and threats to international security that have a negative impact on disarmament processes require a collective response. In this connection, the Russian Federation has firmly and consistently advocated for the swift launch of a multi-stakeholder dialogue involving each and every nuclear-armed State.
A multilateral nuclear disarmament will require establishment of a political and regulatory framework that represents a system of mutual commitments, understandings and procedures. In addressing this issue we should act on the consensus basis, taking into account the interests of all countries. This task has become increasingly important.
We believe that attempts to compel the nuclear-weapon states to give up their stockpiles unconditionally, without taking into account current strategic reality and their legitimate security interests, are counterproductive. Such actions run counter to the principles of the maintenance of international stability, equal and indivisible security for all, and contribute to growing tensions within the international community. We therefore consider it a mistake to develop and promote the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons - although well-intentioned, but still a mistake. We have repeatedly explained, including from this rostrum, why we do not consider it possible to accede to the Treaty.
Meaningful and result-oriented cooperation on nuclear disarmament issues is impossible without taking into account security interests of all the participants of such a process, without mutual respect and strict compliance with the consensus rule, which guarantees a balance of interests, especially in the current difficult situation in the area of international security and stability.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
