Statement by Vladimir Yermakov, Head of the Russian Delegation, Director of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the MFA of the Russian Federation, at the General Debate in the First Committee of the 78th session of the UNGA
Mr. Chair,
I congratulate you on your election to this post and wish you success in your work. I assure you that the Russian delegation will provide you all possible assistance to facilitate substantive discussions.
Since the First Committee's last year session, the frustrating international security landscape has not made us more optimistic as to prospects for improving this situation. On the contrary, global situation continues to rapidly heat up. The accumulated conflict potential, not checked in a timely manner, has already led to an acute crisis in the Euro-Atlantic and threatens to evolve into multiple direct collisions in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the fact that the States possessing nuclear arsenals are directly involved into confrontation multiplies strategic risks.
The roots of the worsening contradictions lie, first of all, in extremely selfish ambitions aggressively implemented by the US-led West to the detriment of other nations' interests. This shameless course is based on Washington's insatiable craving for the unchallenged global dominance and its attempts to impede large-scale, truly landmark shifts in the international relations system by undermining the process of shaping a more just multipolar world order based on a carefully calibrated balance of interests of the international community members.
Those truly sovereign States that firmly oppose the dictates of the West are subjected to demonization and hybrid pressure or outright bullying. The United States and its allies show blatant intolerance for dissent and are trying, in violation of the UN Charter, to impose on other States how they should behave and what foreign policy they should pursue. To consolidate their own hegemony, they persistently strive to substitute international law for a certain "rules-based order" comfortable for them. In fact, this is the usurpation of the prerogative to shape global agenda in all its aspects, including arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ACDN).
Having grossly flouted the principle of equal and indivisible security, the US-led NATO bloc undertook a malicious expansion into the post-Soviet area, forcing our country to take the necessary measures to protect its external security contour. At that, the West continues to raise stakes, dangerously balancing on the brink of a direct armed conflict between nuclear powers and thereby generating the most serious strategic risks.
Meanwhile, disagreements are multiplying at specialized multilateral fora, where chances to find common ground between states in resolving a wide array of international security problems are steadily narrowing.
The accuracy of this assessment has been clearly demonstrated by the first stage of a new review cycle of the NPT – the Treaty which remains for us the only legal reference point and framework to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. Inflated expectations of some participants, a general radicalization of approaches, inflexible promotion of national or group positions without any readiness to look for a compromise, purposeful politicization of discussions with the sole goal of denigrating and provoking an opponent – this is how one can describe the discussion during the first session of the 2026 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee.
We are concerned with the trend of States moving away from not just the decisions and understandings previously set forth in the consensus documents of the NPT review process, but also from the "letter" of the Treaty itself. There are attempts to introduce issues that are extrinsic to the NPT forum, provoking new dividing lines. Many States Parties unreasonably refuse to take into account geopolitical and military-strategic realities and to be guided by the logic of an integrated approach when addressing the situation on the disarmament track. Meanwhile, nuclear disarmament, as well as arms control, cannot be implemented in isolation from the strategic context and international security situation in general. Progress on these tracks is impossible without creating favourable prerequisites that would ensure maintenance of peace and stability based on the principle of undiminished security for all in the process of reducing nuclear weapons.
The concerns of the international community with regard to uncertain prospects for nuclear disarmament are more than justified under the current circumstances, when the degradation of global situation is accompanied by the erosion of the system of arms control agreements. Deeply alarming is potential escalation in the nuclear missile sphere due to the US implementing its plans to deploy weapons that were previously prohibited under the INF Treaty denounced by Washington. Further negative developments around the New START cannot be excluded either. It has been suspended due to destructive attempts by the US to unilaterally interpret the core provisions of the Treaty and in general bend it in its favour and to the detriment of Russia's security. Washington is clearly capable of other destabilizing steps under the slogans of seeking to inflict a "strategic defeat" on our country and ensure the so-called "two-way nuclear deterrence" of Russia and China.
Such circumstances add to the rationale behind the argument that the ideas about an immediate and complete ban on nuclear weapons or about artificial deadlines for reaching "nuclear zero" are counter-productive. According to a well-known apt remark, a stable and safe nuclear-free world is not equal to the world in its current deplorable state minus nuclear weapons.
Such radicalism contradicts the logic of the NPT and will not lead us to the aspired ultimate goal of an increased security for all. We are convinced that progress in nuclear disarmament can only be achieved on a basis of step-by-step and consensual measures accompanied by consistent work to improve the political and military climate while showing respect for the security interests of all parties.
To this end, it is necessary, first of all, to drastically reduce the level of conflict potential in relations between major military powers and ensure a long-overdue overhaul of the international security architecture. Such work should be carried out in a comprehensive manner, take into account the entire range of factors relevant to this area and include not only individual measures to reduce strategic risks but also all-out efforts to eliminate the root causes of fundamental contradictions between nuclear-weapon states in the security field.
Mr. Chair,
One of the central components of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and an important factor in the sustainability and viability of the NPT is its verification mechanism – the IAEA safeguards system. Russia supports the activity of the Agency in this regard; it stands for ensuring an objective, depoliticized and technically sound safeguards mechanism in strict accordance with the agreements and protocols there to concluded between individual States and the IAEA. We recognise the importance of universalization of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement but at the same time we proceed from the voluntary nature of such obligations and inadmissibility of imposing accession to the Additional Protocol as a mandatory measure.
The Russian Federation considers the CTBT the most important document in nuclear non-proliferation and strictly complies with its provisions. More than a quarter of a century has passed since the Treaty was opened for signature but it has still not become a full-fledged international legal instrument. The reason of this is the position of eight states from the Annex 2 whose ratification is necessary for it to become a valid treaty. We would like to once again call on the relevant countries, primarily the United States, to formally accede to the CTBT and thereby contribute to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Mr. Chair,
Crisis phenomena in the international situation aggravated by negative trends in the field of international security directly affect the functioning of international institutions in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. In recent years, the United States and its allies have pursued a course towards subordinating their activities to a certain "order" based on the "rules" they develop. This policy is also reflected in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) where the balanced dialogue and search for compromises have been replaced by the practice of imposing decisions through voting, using the OPCW against individual countries and imposing their will on the entire world community by the United States and its allies.
As a result of the extreme politicization of the OPCW agenda, the States Parties to the CWC are unable to agree on recommendations based on the results of two review cycles of the operation of the Convention. All this leads to the inevitable destruction of the CWC regime and causes irreparable damage to the work and reputation of the Organization. We will continue to insist on restoring the technical nature of the OPCW activities and strengthening its potential as one of the important links in the international system of disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD.
In the context of fulfilling obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the revealed facts of the implementation of a military biological programme in Ukraine with the support of the Pentagon and its affiliated structures, including private companies, require the closest attention. The justified questions that have been officially posed by the Russian side as regards this military biological activity that have been conducted in violation of the BTWC have remained unanswered so far. They remain outstanding and require settlement.
The situation we face confirms the need for the consolidated efforts of the world community to strengthen the BTWC regime, primarily by adopting a universal, legally binding protocol that would apply to all articles of the Convention and provide an effective mechanism of verification. We expect that the implementation of this task will be facilitated by the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention, established by the decision of the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC in line with Russia's proposal. Russian initiatives aimed at strengthening the institutional foundations of the BTWC include the creation of mobile biological and medical teams and the Scientific Advisory Committee, the modernization of confidence-building measures and the creation within the framework of the BTWC of a mechanism for investigating possible violations of the Convention.
There is an urgent need to strengthen the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM), including by updating the principles and procedures that have not been updated since their approval in 1990. In order to facilitate the implementation of this goal, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov sent, on June 14 this year, a note to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres calling to organize a review of the current SGM principles and procedures with a view to updating them. A whole group of countries supported this idea; a number of states submitted similar appeals to the UN Secretary-General. We hope that A. Guterres will immediately start the corresponding review with the help of expert consultants and taking into account the proposals of Member States. We are ready to make the most active contribution to this work.
Mr. Chair,
For decades, the Russian Federation has been in favour of preserving outer space for exclusively peaceful activities of states on an equal footing for the benefit of all humankind. This goal can be achieved only through the development of universally recognised legally binding norms of international law that would be comprehensive in nature and aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS), as envisaged by the decisions of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament held in 1978.
The growing efforts of Western states, led by the United States, to implement policies aimed to place weapons in space and use outer space for warfare to ensure their dominance and superiority require urgent and decisive practical steps by the international community. The development of a legally binding instrument on PAROS with safeguards to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space or the threat or use of force against or by means of outer space objects should be initiated. As a basis, we consider the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects. We expect that the Group of Governmental Experts on PAROS, established by UNGA resolution 77/250, will achieve substantive results and thus contribute to the development of this agreement.
An intermediate confidence-building measure is the international initiative/political commitment on No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (NFP), which is currently the only real instrument for keeping space free of weapons. More than 30 states are already full participants in this initiative.
We are submitting to the First Committee draft resolutions on “No first placement of weapons in outer space,” “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (TCBMs in outer space),” and “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space”. We expect that they will face maximum support and co-sponsorship.
2023 will mark 25 years since the first UN General Assembly resolution on international information security was adopted at the initiative of Russia. We intend to submit for consideration at the 78th session of the UNGA a traditional Russian draft resolution on this theme. Our document reflects the results of this year's activities of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Security in the Use of ICTs and ICTs themselves, as well as the establishment of a global intergovernmental register of points of contact for the exchange of information on computer attacks/incidents. We call on all UN Member States to support our initiative and co-author it.
We have always advocated the establishment of a fair and equitable system of international information security (IIS) under the auspices of the United Nations, based on the principles of respect for national sovereignty, equality of States and non-interference in internal affairs. It is in our common interests to guarantee the peaceful use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and to rule out the possibility of unleashing inter-state conflicts in information space. We see the solution to these problems in the formation of an international legal regime in the area of ICTs through the adoption of a universal treaty.
Mr. Chair,
We note the growing politicization of discussions on the ACDN within the UN General Assembly, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD). We are witnessing the abandonment of substantive dialogue and the persistent attempts by Western countries to turn these bodies into an instrument of pressure on the "undesirable", to erode their mandate and to revise the rules of procedure and the fundamental principles of their functioning. This hinders the adoption of balanced, mutually acceptable decisions.
At the same time, we note that if Member States have the necessary political will, they will be able to achieve meaningful results in the ACDN field. This was clearly confirmed by the consensus recommendations of the UNDC to facilitate the practical implementation of the transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities for the purposes of the PAROS. We urge the UNGA to endorse them by adopting an appropriate resolution on the transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.
Our initiative to elaborate an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism within the CD, which meets the current demands of the international community, is also aimed at establishing unifying collective principles. We believe that its implementation would contribute to overcoming the stagnation of work at the CD on the basis of common interests.
An additional impediment to the development of dialogue among UN Member States on the ACDN issues is the unfairness of the US side in fulfilling its obligations to issue visas to members of delegations attending UN events. This practice is unacceptable and a gross violation of the US international legal obligations under the 1947 UN Headquarters Agreement, which provides for granting unimpeded passage to the area of the Organisation's headquarters to representatives or officials of UN member states, as well as the granting of visas to them "without charge and as promptly as possible". We do not intend to tolerate such irresponsible behaviour by the United States authorities. We demand the immediate launching of an arbitration procedure with regard to the host country of the United Nations Headquarters.
The situation is egregious, since visas have not been issued within the requested time frame to those members of our delegation who were also to participate in the P5 expert meeting, set to be organized by Russia in its capacity as the P5 Chair on the margins of the First Committee. We note that the U.S. actions leading to the disruption of this meeting followed Russia's presentation of its approaches to P5 interaction, which clearly differ from Washington's priorities. We regard these actions as an attempt to undermine the Russian chairmanship of this international format.
Mr. Chair,
The Russian Federation aims at further consistent promotion of the unifying agenda. We look forward to constructive cooperation on the whole range of issues related to ensuring international peace and security. We aim at achieving universally acceptable solutions.
Thank you.
