Statement by First Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry Polyanskiy at a UNSC Briefing on Sudan
We are grateful to Ms. Edem Wosornu, Director of OCHA's Operations and Advocacy Division, and to Ms. Beth Bechdol, FAO Deputy Director-General, for their briefings. We welcome the participation of the Permanent Representatives of Sudan and Egypt in today’s meeting.
We regret to acknowledge that the humanitarian situation in Sudan remains dire. Almost three quarters of health facilities are non-operational, there is a shortage of medicines and two thirds of the population have no access to health care. There have been reports of dangerous diseases spreading across the country. The 2024 humanitarian response for Sudan has not been implemented, which is a serious challenge.
We’ve closely examined the Famine Review Committee (FRC) report on Sudan, which covers the period between October 2024 and the present, and gives forecasts out to May 2025. The reports states that up to 637,000 Sudanese may encounter the threat of imminent famine in the very near future. It also notes some positive trends – over the reporting period, the number of people suffering from malnutrition in the country have fallen by 1 million. Let us emphasize right away that Sudan is not experiencing nor can experience a severe famine. As the authors of the publication stress, there is only a risk of such a situation developing in five small areas of the country, four of which are camps for refugees.
Sudan has 7.5-8.5 million hectares of fertile land, most of this land is irrigated. By this yardstick, Sudan is far better-placed than almost all Arab and many African countries. According to the estimates by the Ministry of Agriculture of Sudan, in the current crop year the country might harvest 6-7 million tons of cereals (primarily corn and sorghum), whereas an average annual demand is about 4-4.5 million tons. As for other key crops, including wheat, Sudan may well meet its needs through imports. These data are available to the WFP and FAO operating in the country.
Against this background, the conclusions of the report look at least strange. First, the data provided are purely anticipatory in nature. As a reminder, previous reports by the FRC foretold that Sudan would inevitably face famine in September-October 2024. As we can see, such alarmist assessments didn’t prove to be correct. Secondly, the report was prepared remotely, without collecting information “in the field”. Let me remind you that as early as in 2022, representatives of the FRC were working diligently with relevant Sudanese ministries and agencies, meticulously gathering information on food security, verifying it with the government of the country, which provided them with everything they needed. However, 2024 saw no such visits.
What also drew our attention is that the FRC assessments were not fully in line with the analysis carried out by the Sudan IPC Technical Working Group (TWG). Unlike the members of the above-mentioned Committee, the TWG is working “in the field” and includes representatives of the UN and various NGOs, as well as government agencies. That was explicitly pointed out in the report, but unfortunately no further clarification was provided. It would be interesting to find out where the discrepancies in the assessment of the hunger in Sudan lie.
We were surprised by the fact that the FRC report was circulated in the Western media as early as December 23, whereas the IPC country team continued to verify with the Sudanese on the content of the report until December 24. Thus, the FRC report was submitted before the IPC concluded its work. Apparently, what they wanted to do is to promote dubious speculations about the issue of famine before the Christmas break. This cannot but raise suspicions about potential manipulation of this material. In other words, the authors of the report didn’t deem it necessary to coordinate with the Sudanese and verify the information they provide (as they did previously), but rather they intended to trigger media hype.
What also drew our attention is that the IPC and the FRC publications are using outdated demographic data, which they received as far back as in 2022. They do not factor in the large numbers of refugees and IDPs nor the outflow of people to other countries. Moreover, they claim that the latest report assesses the hunger situation in 15 out of 18 states of Sudan, including Darfur and Kordofan. But specialists’ access to these states is restricted or even impossible due to ongoing hostilities. How, then, did the authors draw their conclusions and why are these states colored in dark red in the report?
Upon examining the FRC report we couldn’t but think that the issue of hunger in Sudan is being politicized and exploited to exert pressure on the Sudanese government. And certain Council members enthusiastically pick up on those speculations and bring them to the table. We have an impression that someone is desperate for famine to eventually begin in Sudan. In addition, what is ignored in the report is the fact that the rebels deliberately obstruct agricultural work and food distribution in the areas they control, and devastate food supplies.
Mr. President,
Nothing of the above-mentioned questions the fact that the humanitarian situation in Sudan is dire and that Sudanese refugees face serious problems in neighboring countries, nor does it take us away from the need to make arrangements to remedy the situation. As we have repeatedly emphasized, in order to enhance food security in Sudan, we need to ensure the equal distribution of food and to address the issue of ordinary Sudanese lacking money to buy this food. We believe that instead of “instrumentalizing” the topics of hunger and humanitarian access, we should prioritize agricultural development, farmers' access to markets, and the distribution of food vouchers among the people. We know that there are various specialized agencies within the UN system that are carrying out such work. We are very much in favor of expanding such programs.
What should underpin the efforts of Port Sudan to remedy the food security situation in the country is the humanitarian assistance that is to be provided both by the UN specialized agencies and their partners, and by all States friendly to Sudan. It is important to make sure that this assistance is channeled exclusively through the central Government and is not geared to promoting destructive agendas in the country under the humanitarian guise. Time after time, Port Sudan has shown flexibility in addressing these emerging problems – it has voluntarily opened access for aid through a number of border crossings and is working to expand the centers for humanitarian deliveries within Sudan. At the same time, we call on everybody not to whip up tension by pressing the Government to lift all bureaucratic restrictions, including the issuance of visas and permits to move around the country. These issues are the sovereign prerogative of Sudan; hence, demanding from Sudan to deal with these issues right away is nothing but a sort of encroachment upon its sovereignty. Moreover, denying the issuance of visas to ten workers out of several thousand is hardly a game changer. As for the restrictions on movement imposed by the Government, they are largely aimed at bolstering the protection of humanitarians themselves, as, unfortunately, they are working in dangerous conditions in Sudan.
For its part, Russia continues to make its contribution to providing humanitarian assistance to Sudan. On December 30, 2024, yet another 70-ton consignment of Russian food aid was delivered to Port Sudan.
Speaking more broadly, addressing the Sudan's humanitarian and food-related challenges is inextricably linked to the need for a swift cessation of hostilities and a start of political settlement. Once the acute phase of the conflict is over, it is important to take practical steps to resume the broadest possible inter-Sudanese dialogue. At the same time, we deem inadmissible any destructive external interference in the affairs of the friendly State of Sudan.
With regard to what a number of Western countries said today lamenting the draft resolution blocked by Russia on November 18, I would like to reiterate that we will continue to prevent passing unbalanced decisions by the Council, as such decisions tend to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan for the benefit of the external sponsors of its instability. We stand convinced that the Sudanese people can and should resolve their internal problems on their own.
Thank you.
