Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation Andrey Belousov at the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons General Debate
Mr President,
Before proceeding with the statement, I would like to carry out the instruction of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and convey his address to the participants and guests of the Conference:
"Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
I welcome you on the occasion of the opening of the regular XI Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The obligations on non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided for by the Treaty are of principled importance to the international security and fully serve the interests of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.
Our country, as a responsible State Party to the NPT and its depositary, strictly adheres to the letter and spirit of the Treaty. We believe that the current challenging international situation evidently requires additional multilateral efforts to create conditions for further progress towards building a world free of nuclear weapons while necessarily upholding the principle of undiminished security for all.
It is our position that all States complying with their obligations under the Treaty in good faith shall have the inalienable right to enjoy the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without any restrictions. I would like to confirm that Russia, as a leader in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, is ready to continue to develop constructive cooperation in this area with all interested NPT States Parties.
We hope that the Conference will be productive and will significantly contribute to the strengthening of the non‑proliferation regime, ensuring peace, security, and stability on the planet.
I sincerely wish you successful work and all the best."
The Russian delegation requests the Secretariat to issue this address as an official document of the Conference.
Mr President,
We extend our congratulations on your election to this responsible post and assure you of our continued readiness to engage on all issues arising during the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We commend the UN Secretariat and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs for their efforts in organising this forum.
Mr President,
Distinguished colleagues,
The NPT is a cornerstone of international peace and security. As a State Party and one of its depositaries, the Russian Federation remains committed to the letter and spirit of the Treaty, fully complies with all its obligations thereunder, and stands for its further strengthening. The National Report we have submitted sets out in detail the steps taken by our country in recent years to implement the Treaty's provisions.
Over the years of its existence, the NPT has proven to be a viable instrument that serves the interests and common good of humanity. A historic milestone was the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty in 1995. This decision is not subject to review.
The uniqueness and value of the NPT lie in the balance enshrined in its text between three equally important and mutually reinforcing pillars: nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The interrelationship between these elements is the foundation of the Treaty that cannot be broken.
The current state of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime gives cause for concern. The Treaty is under severe strain. The trend to instrumentalise the NPT for self-serving political purposes unrelated to the subject matter of the Treaty has once again found expression in the unprovoked, unjustified and unlawful aggression by Israel and the United States against Iran, in which civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards have been subjected to multiple attacks. The tragedy of the current situation in Iran for the NPT lies in the fact that under the pretext of false allegations of a military nuclear programme a State blatantly disregarding the Treaty and a depositary State acting in its interests have jointly attacked a good-faith Party to the Treaty.
We note that the tendency on the part of a group of Western States and their allies to exploit the NPT for their short-term political interests has long been evident. In recent years, such actions have only become more frequent and ever more cynical.
The deterioration of the international security environment and strategic stability continues to be fuelled by the provocative and destructive actions of Western nuclear-weapon States. This significantly undermines the prospects for a substantive and fruitful dialogue on arms control and disarmament, both within the NPT framework and in other relevant multilateral forums and formats. The US has categorically rejected the Russian initiative to preserve the legacy of the New START Treaty through voluntary self-limitations. It has further declared its readiness to commence at any time the build-up of its nuclear arsenal beyond the Treaty’s limits, as well as to resume nuclear testing.
For several years now, the United Kingdom has been enhancing its strategic nuclear capabilities. It has also redeployed US nuclear weapons on its national territory and announced its participation in the further expansion of NATO’s "nuclear sharing" arrangements, a practice that is deeply destabilising and has undermined the NPT regime for many decades. France, which announced on the eve of the Review Conference plans to increase its nuclear capabilities, is actively drawing European non‑nuclear weapon States into arrangements reminiscent of the so‑called "extended nuclear deterrence" frameworks practised by the US in the Asia‑Pacific region, which are intended to reinforce the US "nuclear umbrella" over Europe.
All these developments are taking place with the vigorous approval and, as has already been noted, often the direct involvement of other countries of the "collective West," many of which are ever more insistently making suggestions that are detrimental to the NPT, implying the possibility of a move towards the possession of nuclear weapons. The EU leadership appears to be guided by similar considerations. Moreover, information has come to light that certain actors in London and Paris were seriously considering the outrageous and utterly unacceptable idea of transferring elements of nuclear weapons to Ukraine, a step that would directly undermine the NPT's core provisions. This crosses all conceivable boundaries, particularly given that we have not even outlined all of our concerns regarding the obstacles created by Western States to the full implementation of the NPT objectives. This is set out in detail in the relevant section of the National Report of the Russian Federation, as well as in several of our working papers submitted in the lead‑up to the Review Conference.
In these circumstances, our country seeks to act in the most responsible and well-considered manner. In the absence of US engagement with our pragmatic proposals on post-START arrangements, we will continue to shape our course in this area based on a thorough analysis of the military policies of Western nuclear-weapon States and the overall strategic environment. In the longer term, we remain open to seeking equal and mutually acceptable, dialogue-based solutions aimed at the comprehensive stabilisation of the strategic environment, provided that appropriate conditions are in place for such engagement, which should focus on viable solutions serving the core interests of all parties.
For Russia, taking into account political-military and strategic realities when considering any disarmament initiatives remains an unwavering imperative. With regard to the implementation of the disarmament pillar of the NPT, the only international legal benchmark for us is the Treaty itself. At the same time, the ultimate objective of building a nuclear-weapon-free and safer world for all must be pursued through a fundamental approach that ensures that such efforts are seamlessly integrated into the framework of general and complete disarmament, while upholding the principle of undiminished security for all.
We cannot agree with attempts to impose on nuclear-weapon States an immediate and unconditional renunciation of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence without developing effective alternative security mechanisms. Such a radical approach amounts to a complete disregard for the legitimate interests of our country and for fundamental disarmament principles, as well as a deliberate unwillingness to adequately assess and take due account of the state of international security and strategic stability. At the same time, the Russian Federation remains open to the highly difficult yet inevitable discussion on how to collectively foster an environment conducive to disarmament. Both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States will have to contribute to this process.
Mr President,
We consider the IAEA safeguards system to be a reliable instrument for verifying States’ compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. We reaffirm our commitment to continued efforts to preserve and strengthen the Agency’s verification mechanism. Our view is that the presumption of innocence and respect for the sovereignty of States must continue to underpin the Agency’s safeguards activities. In any reforms, the Agency’s verification mechanism must remain objective, depoliticised, technically sound, and fully consistent with the safeguards agreements concluded between States and the Agency. We support the universalisation of the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements with the Agency, with the understanding that its conclusion is a purely voluntary step.
The establishment and functioning of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in various regions of the world, as envisaged by Article VII of the NPT, contribute to the strengthening of the Treaty-based international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear-weapon States' accession to the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing such zones is the best way to provide the members of the NWFZs with legally binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them.
We understand the desire of many non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT to jointly develop such legally binding assurances and to codify them within a universal legally binding agreement. This initiative merits the closest attention.
Russia has ratified all protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties it has signed, thereby providing legally binding negative security assurances (NSAs) to over one hundred countries. Russia’s reservations to the protocols are intended to provide clarity and do not affect the interests of States that faithfully comply with their obligations under NWFZ treaties.
In this context, it is necessary to give serious consideration to whether there are sufficient grounds for providing NSAs to States conventionally regarded as non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT, yet which are engaged in "nuclear sharing" and "extended nuclear deterrence" arrangements through inter-State military cooperation frameworks. This matter calls for the most careful and thorough consideration.
We reaffirm the significance and relevance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. As one of its co-sponsors, we support the efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD-free zone) in the region. We participate in the annual UN Conference on a WMD‑free zone as an observer. We make a meaningful contribution to its substantive work. It is vitally important to ensure the engagement of all invited States in the Conference.
The current increase in global interest in nuclear energy demonstrates its continued relevance and importance. More and more States are incorporating nuclear energy into their energy mix and are stepping up the use of peaceful nuclear energy in industry, agriculture, medicine and other key sectors of their economies. Nuclear energy ensures both stability and security of energy supply, while also contributing to the climate agenda objectives owing to the low-carbon nature of nuclear generation. This unique combination of features gives nuclear technologies a crucial role in the future of humanity.
Article IV of the NPT guarantees all States Parties the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Russian Federation is actively exercising this right itself and assisting other countries in doing so. We have consistently advocated broader access for the NPT States Parties to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and the development of international cooperation in this field. We emphasise that each State Party to the NPT has the right to freely pursue its independent national nuclear energy policy and to cooperate in this field without discrimination.
We consider the imposition of restrictions on States’ nuclear energy sectors outside the framework of the UN Council, as well as other measures of unfair competition in this area, to be a violation of Article IV of the NPT. Equally unacceptable are attempts to introduce excessively intrusive inspections under the IAEA verification system, or to use the NPT as a means of introducing unjustified restrictions on States’ access to peaceful nuclear technology under the pretext of non-proliferation.
We hope that the 11th NPT Review Conference will be held in a spirit of mutual respect and constructive engagement. We believe it essential to focus our efforts on developing consensus-based solutions acceptable to all participants, with a view to strengthening the Treaty and its fundamental pillars.
Thank you.
