Statement by Mr.Vladimir Safronkov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the Security Council on Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council
We would like to congratulate the delegation of Bolivia on the start of its presidency of the Security Council and to note the timeliness of today’s joint briefing on three of its important subsidiary bodies.
We thank the briefers, all of whom clearly identified the tasks facing the Council and the entire international community in combating the threat of terrorism. We are grateful to the Permanent Representative of Peru for his detailed report on the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its Executive Directorate (CTED).
The core of the CTC’s mandate should continue to be the professional and impartial assessment of States’ anti-terrorism efforts. We recognize that the number of monitoring missions, including those carried out jointly with other Security Council bodies and the Office of Counter-Terrorism, has increased significantly, and we have taken positive note of the efforts of Under-Secretary-General Vladimir Voronkov and Executive Director Michèle Coninsx.
We would like to remind the Council that paragraph 12 of resolution 2395 (2017) directs the leadership of the Committee to report to the Council on problems in obtaining the consent of States to country visits and concluding reports, as well as on how the CTC’s recommendations are being implemented. We hope to see a detailed analysis of the situation in this area.
We agree that providing information on current threats and best practices in the fight against terrorism is an extremely important aspect of the CTC’s activities. However, it is very clear that the Executive Directorate’s attention has frequently been concerned with topics such as rehabilitating and reintegrating terrorists, strengthening the role of women, protecting human rights and collaborating with civil society at the expense of its counter-terrorism tasks.
Those are all important issues, of course, but they are not directly related to the Committee’s basic mandate, and it is important to ensure that it continues to focus on the area of counterterrorism or run the risk of losing key reference points. We believe that it is counterproductive to attempt to transform the CTC and its Executive Directorate, with their unique tools, into a quasi-human rights protection mechanism. Introducing individual ways of working with some violent extremists and violent extremist groups into the Committee’s agenda is even less acceptable, and in our view is a targeted approach to undermining the international legal base of counterterrorism with the aim of exempting tame terrorists from responsibility.
Instead, we propose that the Committee and Executive Directorate confine their focus to genuinely topical issues of countering incitement to terrorism and terrorist propaganda, in accordance with resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2354 (2017), as well as suppressing the supply of arms to terrorists, in line with resolution 2370 (2017).
There is still much to be done in those areas. Speaking of the unique nature of the CTC and CTED mandate, we would like to draw attention to the depoliticization and professionalism that have distinguished both bodies since their establishment. We believe that the attempts of some Committee members to pressure the Executive Directorate into limiting its collaboration with international organizations working on counter-terror issues are unacceptable.
We hope that CTED itself will strictly follow its own procedures and practices developed over the years and will continue to be a unifying platform. We note the work of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and consider it one of the Council’s most effective mechanisms on the counterterrorism front.
We are pleased to note that this is Kazakhstan is in large part responsible for this, as is Ambassador Umarov personally as the Committee’s current Chair. We believe it is crucial to ensure the effective implementation of Council resolutions on the counterterrorism sanctions regime with regard to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaida. Given the growing presence of ISIL in Afghanistan and the threat of the further expansion of jihadists into the countries of Central Asia, we believe that one of our priorities should be expanding the Security Council’s counter-terrorism sanctions regime to individuals and organizations that are part of or directly connected to the Afghan wing of the Islamic State’s extremist organization. It makes sense to continue to concentrate on the problem of foreign terrorist fighters on the counter-terrorism sanctions lists who are actively moving to States of origin or to third countries from Syria and Iraq, in order to prevent and suppress their criminal activities.
We support the effective work of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, whose reports are an important tool for our joint work, and we urge Member States to work closely with their experts.
We expect the Monitoring Team’s reports to be as objective as possible and rely only on verified sources of information. The Monitoring Team’s country visits are a significant factor in its work, and we hope that it will focus on trips to countries that are in armed confrontations with international terrorism and States that are dealing directly with terrorist efforts. That is critical to obtaining first-hand information. Resolution 1540 (2004) is a key, universal, legally binding instrument in the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), requiring all countries to adopt effective measures to prevent weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-State actors.
On the whole, we are satisfied with the implementation of the resolution. We commend the efforts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) under the chairmanship of Bolivia, and of its Group of Experts, for organizing courses for national focal points, conducting country visits to develop voluntary national action plans, providing assistance to countries that need it and maintaining contacts with relevant specialized international, regional and subregional organizations. However, much remains to be done to achieve the main goal, the full implementation of the resolution by all countries.
Russia is working actively not only to implement the resolution but also to provide appropriate assistance to other States. With the support of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), we have held courses on resolution 1540 (2004) issues for OSCE member States in Rostov-on-Don. In a few days’ time, Russia’s Federal Service for Technical and Export Control is organizing a seminar in Moscow on export control issues for member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The Security Council must respond robustly to any violations of resolution 1540 (2004) and actions to help non-State actors to gain access to weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical weapons. The challenges in that area demand that we unite international efforts and reject double standards. In that regard, we would like to remind the Council of the initiative by the Russian Federation to develop and adopt a convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism. Today’s discussion confirms that eradicating terrorism is possible only with broad international cooperation.
We urge that practical steps be taken to establish an international counter-terrorism coalition.
