ON RUSSIA’S POSITION AT 67TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
2. Special relevance is attached to the objective to intensify joint efforts aimed at strengthening the legal framework for relations between states, promote the rule of international law within the UN and universal interpretation and application of international agreements and UN decisions, including the UN Security Council.
3. Enhanced collective engagement should be based on strict compliance with the UN Charter prerogatives of the UN Security Council as the principal body bearing responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Russia will be decisively countering attempts to use the UN Security Council for legitimizing external interference, including military interference, in the internal affairs of states in circumvention of the UN Charter and putting political pressure from the UN Security Council on "unwanted" regimes, including under the pretext of protecting civilians.
4. The experience related to settlement of the crisis in the Middle East and North Africa confirms the need for the Security Council to elaborate clear peacekeeping mandates in compliance with the UN Charter and basic peacekeeping principles, as well as to ensure strict control of its implementation. While mandating actions specified in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is important for the UN Security Council to determine concrete parameters, purpose and extent of use of force and the importance of strict compliance with the decisions adopted.
5. Any domestic political contradictions in countries of the Middle East and North Africa should be resolved in a peaceful manner in compliance with the Constitutions and through national dialogues. While elaborating international mechanisms for stabilizing the situation, we should be guided by the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and of dealing with problems without external interference.
The main objective for the international community is to prevent the new Middle East from becoming a source of new challenges to international stability and security, the non-proliferation regime and dialogue between civilizations.
6. Settlement of the crisis in Syria is possible only through political and diplomatic means on the basis of K. Annan’s Peace Plan, enshrined in resolutions of the UN Security Council. The priority objective is to ensure a full cessation of the violence by all the conflict parties and launch a comprehensive dialogue between the government and opposition on the set of issues related to reformation of the country’s political system.
Settlement of the conflict in Syria will to a great extent determine the model for actions of the international community with regard to domestic crises. Neither unilateral actions nor military intervention can ensure a peaceful settlement. They would bring the opposite results – total destabilization of the situation both in the country and in the broader regional context.
7. Large-scale transformational processes in the Middle East should not impede finding badly needed solutions to the persisting problems in the region. Progressing towards a comprehensiveArab-Israeli settlement should be effected on the international legal basis, i.e., Resolutions of the UN Security Council 242, 338, 1397, 1515 and 1850, the Madrid principles, the roadmap, the Arab Peace Initiative, and the previous arrangements agreed upon by the parties to the conflict. We stand for establishment of a sovereign, viable and contiguous Palestinian State based on the 1967 borders and the agreed territorial exchanges and with East Jerusalem as its capital, which would live in peace and security with Israel.
All the parties to the conflict should renounce violence and unilateral steps which could predetermine the outcomes of the final status negotiations. Construction of Israeli settlements on the occupied Palestinian territories should be stopped.
We are mindful of the need to preserve the leading role of the quartet of Middle East mediators in facilitating the search for ways to restart the negotiation process between Palestinians and Israelis. With that said, we are against the attempts to question the efficiency of this format of international assistance for settlement of the Middle East conflict.
We confirm our readiness to hold a conference on the Middle East in Moscow. It can be held as soon as the necessary conditions are in place, primarily as regards the resumption of direct contacts between Palestine and Israel.
8. International support of efforts to promote stabilization in Iraq is among the long-term goals of the United Nations in the Middle East. It is important to avoid ethnic and religious division of the country, which would be catastrophic both for Iraq and the region as a whole. To do that the Iraqi people should intensify efforts to foster an inclusive dialogue involving the country’s major political forces and religious communities.
With regard to the issue of rendering Iraq exempt from the application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, we still believe that the Security Council should review the progress in the implementation of the relative resolutions and gradually withdraw the provisions that have been implemented or become no longer relative.
Iraq is yet to settle the issue of its border with Kuwait, engage in cooperation with the UN in searching for the missing Kuwaiti people, citizens of third countries, as well as lost Kuwaiti property.
We support the efforts of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, whose political mediation is highly sought after.
9. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan should remain the coordinator of international civil efforts to stabilize the situation in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The UN plays an important role in monitoring the drug situation in the country. The scaling down of the international military presence in Afghanistan, sanctioned by the UN Security Council, should be effected also on the basis of the UN Security Council decision and the report on the completion of the mandate in question.
The leading role in achieving national reconciliation should be played by the Afghani people, while the dialogue with the combatants should be based upon the three well-known principles (renunciation of violence by the combatants, their recognition of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and severance of all ties with al-Qaeda) and not to the detriment of the UN Security Council sanctions regime.
Of special concern is the situation with illicit drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan, which is posing a threat to international peace and stability. It is important to take effective steps to physically destroy drug crops and laboratories, stop precursors supplies in Afghanistan, include drug lords in the Security Council sanctions list. In this context, implementation of the decisions of the Moscow-Paris Pact seems to be sought after, the Pact having become one of the most efficient international instruments for countering drug threat emanating from the territory of Afghanistan. Of continuing relevance is the objective to foster practical cooperation between the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is conducting the preventive operation Kanal, and the International Security Assistance Force.
10. It would be counterproductive to discuss the situation around Georgia and Abkhazia, as well as the issue of "internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees" from Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the United Nations platform. Georgia's initiative is politicized and has nothing to do with finding ways to resolve humanitarian problems. It is detrimental to the Geneva discussions as a working format for discussing refugees and IDPs issues, as well as lowers the degree of trust between Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia.
The Geneva discussions and the Georgian-Abkhaz Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism involving representatives of the United Nations fully meet the goal of stabilizing the situation in this part of Transcaucasia.
11. We stand for a just, comprehensive and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, which provides for creation in Cyprus of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the top-level agreements of 1977 and 1979. The way to resolve the Cyprus problem should be put forward by the Cypriots themselves and serve the interests of both communities. The involvement of the international community in the Cyprus affairs, including the efforts undertaken within the UN Secretary-General's Good Offices Mission, should remain complementary and unbiased. Unattainable timetables of negotiations and recourse to external arbitration is not acceptable.
12. We reiterate the position of not recognizing Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is a binding international legal framework for reaching Kosovo settlement. We regard the negotiation process as a tool for stabilizing the still turbulent situation in the region. The international presence stationed there should act on the basis of status neutrality. We are not satisfied with the progress made in the investigation by the EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia into the facts of illicit human organs trafficking in Kosovo discovered by the PACE rapporteur Dick Marty. Guided by the above considerations, we supported Belgrade’s proposal to transfer the investigation to the UN.
13. We stand for a political and diplomatic settlement of the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula through the resumption of the six-party talks, taking into account the legitimate interests of each party. Strict observance of the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 should be an important constituent of this process.
14. Comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation around Iran's nuclear program (INP) can only be achieved by political and diplomatic means through negotiations between the six-nation group and Iran in the spirit of mutual respect and on the basis of phased approach and reciprocity. Of special importance will be enhanced Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA with a view to clarifying all the aspects of the country's nuclear activities. We are against increased sanctions pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Additional unilateral restrictions upset the effectiveness of the sanctions regime, as well as disrupt collective and concerted efforts by the international community to obviate the concerns around the INP.
15. We consider sanctions as one of the UN Security Council important instruments that should promote political and diplomatic settlement of international conflicts and crisis situations.
Decisions by the UN Security Council to introduce sanctions should lead to targeted restrictions against the instigators of conflicts. The sanctions regime should be subject to periodic reviews, provide for humanitarian exemptions, and have limitations on the duration of proposed measures and clearly set criteria for lifting the sanctions.
We are against the arbitrary interpretation of the sanctions measures and broad interpretation of the Security Council resolutions, which in reality leads to the dilution of the sanctions introduced by the Council. We consider it unacceptable that a number of States are using unilateral sanctions in circumvention of the UN Security Council, which undermines international political and diplomatic efforts and weakens the integrity of the world community. These measures often lead to the violation of the sovereignty of third countries, infringing their right to legal international economic activities.
16. Along with the overwhelming majority of the international community members, Russia strongly condemns the trade and economic blockade imposed by the USA on Cuba and stands for the earliest abolition of this meaningless anti-Cuban practice, which contradicts the principles of international law and disrupts the normal inter-state relations.
17. Finding a complex approach to prevention and settlement of conflicts in Africa would promote increased responsibility owned by the African people for the continent’s future and a sustainable growth in African countries. In this context, special support should be given to the efforts aimed at enhancing the cooperation between the UN and the African Union and building peacekeeping capacities in African states.
18. We do not see any alternative to peaceful political means of normalization of the relations between Sudan and South Sudan. We should ensure that there are no new sources of open military confrontation between them, which would endanger both the neighboring countries and the entire region. Reciprocal renunciation by the parties of the support of the military opposition engaged in activities against the legitimate authorities in the territory of both countries would help establish good-neighbourly and mutually beneficial relations between the two states.
19. The UN peacekeeping activity remains an important tool for settling conflicts and fulfilling initial tasks of nation-building in the countries at the post-conflict stage. We are willing to promote this work in full compliance with the principles of the UN Charter, and increase Russia's participation (today 80 Russian military observers and policemen are participating in 8 UN PKOs). A balanced approach is required to implement the concept of robust peacekeeping, which sometimes might lead to unjustified expansion of mandates of operations and increase in PKOs budget. We believe that the Russian proposal on intensification of the SC subsidiary body envisaged by the UN Charter – the Military Staff Committee – is still important for improving peacekeeping activities and enhancing the UN SC military expertise.
20. We intend to promote the efficiency of the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s coordinating and consultative functions in the framework of its mandate. Starting from 2008, Russia has been annually contributing $2 mln. to the Peacebuilding Fund. We have made steps to establish a human resources pool of the Russian corps of civil experts in peacebuilding with the view of using it in the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.
21. There is a need in a policy aimed at rational UN reform, its adaptation to modern realities with maintenance of its intergovernmental nature and inviolability of the principles enshrined in its Charter. The main objective of the UN SC reform is to make it more representative without detriment to its efficiency. Taking into account the existing differences among Member States, it is necessary to continue searching for a compromise model of the future Security Council that would enjoy the widest support of the UN Member States (much more significant than two thirds of the votes of the Members States required in accordance with the UN Charter). The negotiation process should be carried out on all the proposals without artificial narrowing of the agenda, breaking up of the "package" of key issues related to the SC reform or putting to the vote of separate proposals. Regardless of the chosen UN SC reform model, prerogatives of its current permanent members, including right of veto, should remain intact.
Attention should be paid to the meaningful proposals to revitalize the work of the UN General Assembly, including those aimed at raising its efficiency. However, the prerogatives of the principal UN bodies envisaged in the UN Charter, should be respected.
22. The development of interaction between the UN and regional organizations, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter appears to be important. Our priority is to develop cooperation between the UN and CSTO and SCO, including through adoption of relevant UN GA resolutions during the 67th session, and establishment of a mechanism of regular consultations and introduction of joint initiatives to the UN in the framework of CSTO and SCO. Interaction between the UN and the CSTO in the field of peacekeeping appears to be promising.
23. The UN disarmament triad – the UN GA First Committee, the UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament – is going through stagnation, which is rooted in politics. In the current situation, we believe it is necessary to counter destructive proposals that might potentially cause degradation of the whole UN multilateral mechanism of disarmament. We believe that it is important to preserve it and search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of the current rules of procedure.
We support maintenance and strengthening of the NPT and other WMD non-proliferation regimes, establishment of favorable conditions for further reduction in nuclear potentials by all nuclear States.
24. We encourage bringing order to the global arms circulation, including improvement of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. We are ready to work on measures to stop the diversion of SALW to illicit trafficking.
25. We intend to actively work on prevention of arms race in new fields, primarily, the outer space. In this context, we believe it is important to focus on the work in the Group of governmental experts on transparency and confidence- building measures in outer space activities.
26. We will continue our work on issues of international information security (IIS). It is necessary to intensify the international efforts on preventing the use of information and communication technologies for criminal, terrorist and politico-military purposes, as well as for interference in the domestic affairs of States.
We encourage a broad international discussion of Russia-sponsored draft rules of conduct in the global information space and an international convention on IIS.
27. We support strengthening of the international counter-terrorism system with the UN as its main coordinating centre. Only actions of the whole international community taken in compliance with the UN Charter, SC resolutions, relevant principles and norms of international law can provide a response to the global terrorist threat.
Further implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) is critically important for counter-terrorism activities. We support the outcomes of the Third Review of the Implementation of the UN GCTS (June 2012), including in such fields as terrorism prevention, fight against extremist and violent ideology and the use of media in the terrorist purposes.
We welcome the focus of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) on the regional dimension and comprehensive implementation of the GCTS. We support the efforts on implementation of the relevant Action Plan for Central Asia with the use of capacities of CSTO, SCO and CIS.
28. Piracy off the coast of Somalia remains a serious destabilizing factor. Efforts on establishment of anti-piracy judicial mechanisms with international component in the spirit of Russia-sponsored Resolution of the UNSC 1976 will contribute to effective prosecution of pirate communities and persons who control their financial flows. Information exchange, establishment of special databases are very important for international interaction in the field of fighting piracy, including cooperation in the framework of new Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Centre, based in the Seychelles. Russian proposals to enhance cooperation on fighting piracy in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council are still relevant.
29. We promote wider participation and effective implementation of the main UN anti-criminal conventions – conventions against transnational organized crime (and its supplementing protocols) and against corruption.
We support the efforts aimed at close international interaction in the framework of the mechanism of implementation review of the convention on corruption, launching of effective procedures of corruption assets return to the country of origin, and expanding of technical assistance to interested States.
30. We have been closely following the activities of the International Criminal Court (ICC). We are interested in an objective and impartial handling of the South Ossetian case by the Court. We urge the ICC – while working on Darfur and Libyan dossiers – to maintain a rational balance between the interests of international justice and the necessity of building and supporting the peace processes in these countries.
31. We intend to make all necessary efforts to complete in due time the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and transfer them to a format of a "residual mechanism" in accordance with UN SC Resolution 1966 (2010).
32. We note the significant increase in the number of cases on the docket of the UN International Court of Justice. This fact reflects higher credibility of this main judicial body and States' stronger intention to address inter-State disputes peacefully. We support this trend.
33. The General Assembly will traditionally consider the report of the regular session of the International Law Commission of the UN. We urge to take due account of the Commission's experience in the work of the Organization.
34. We continue to support the integrity, comprehensive strengthening and proper implementation of a fundamental international legal act in the field of the law of the sea – the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1992 that celebrates 30th anniversary this year. We believe States should behave in the world ocean in strict compliance with the Convention. We welcome the work of the bodies established under the Convention this year – the International Seabed Authority, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
35. With respect to the responsibility of States to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, we are guided by the provisions of the corresponding section of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. In our view, the UN SC mandate is crucial for implementation of this concept. Its practical implementation should be focused on rendering comprehensive assistance to States when peaceful means of settlement do not suffice and national authorities are clearly unable to protect their population. We believe that any broad interpretation of the term "responsibility to protect" is counterproductive, and we warn against ill-considered and hasty attempts to arbitrarily apply this concept to country-specific cases with the use of force. The main thing is that responsibility to protect should not be used as a pretext for changing undesirable political regimes.
36. At the high-level meeting on the "rule of law" in the framework of the UN GA, we will call for strengthening the legal basis of international relations and ensuring strict compliance with it by all participants in the international legal instruments. We will promote adoption of a non-confrontational consensus document on the outcome of this meeting with the focus on mainstreaming the issue of "the rule of law" at the international level.
37. We support further discussions on interfaith and inter-cultural cooperation in the General Assembly for peace and prevention of civilizational split. We reaffirm the commitment to participate in various UN initiatives in this area, including the Alliance of Civilizations and the Tripartite Forum on Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation for Peace, the Ministerial meetings on interfaith dialogue and cooperation for peace.
38. We believe it is necessary to enhance the global efforts on development of the religious dimension of the inter-civilizational dialogue. It appears that to address this task it would be reasonable to establish a consultative council of religions under the UN auspices so that representatives of main world religions and political circles can exchange views on the UN humanitarian and religious agenda.
39. Fight against racism, discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance is one of the priorities of our country. States should combine their efforts in countering these shameful and destructive phenomena.
Turning racial, national and religious intolerance into an instrument of political fight raises special concerns, as it threatens democratic principles and human rights. Growth in neo-Nazism ideologies, attempts to rehabilitate Fascism, revive theories of racial purity and superiority are the most flagrant manifestations of these trends. Many States are facing the growth in neo-Nazism and neo-Fascist organizations, expansion of their membership especially with young people, growth in crimes based on racial, national and ethnic grounds. For this reason, Russia believes that States bearing the main responsibility for fighting racism, should assess the current situation in an objective manner, without using "double standards". Russia will again submit to the General Assembly a traditional draft resolution on the "Inadmissibility of certain practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", aimed at counteracting neo-Nazism and revanchist trends in the world.
40. The UN should continue to play the leading role in promoting and protecting human rights in the international arena. At the same time the need is increasingly apparent to strengthen the moral and ethical approach to the implementation of the modern concept of human rights. These are the goals that form the basis of the Russian initiative, formalized in the decision of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), to develop a study on how a better understanding of traditional values of humanity can contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights.
We call for reduction of confrontation in inter-state cooperation in the human rights field. Politicized decisions on the human rights situation in individual countries is not conducive to building constructive dialogue with them. This practice is even more inappropriate given the successful functioning of the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council. In view of the need to further strengthen the role of the HRC, it was decided to nominate Russia for re-election to the Council for 2014-2016.
41. We support the activities of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights by annually contributing $2 million to its budget. In order to enhance the Office's work, it is necessary to improve its transparency and accountability to the UN Member States, including through negotiation of its programme of activities with States (i.e. Programme 19).
42. We deem international humanitarian cooperation and the activities of international humanitarian agencies, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as an important part of the integrated efforts aimed at maintaining peace and strengthening security and stability at the national, regional and global level.
We note the necessity to enhance the role of the UNHCR in assisting the development of national systems and initiatives related to providing the protection to refugees. We have to step up efforts aimed at avoiding politicization of UNHCR’s activities related to providing international protection and assistance to refugees, including their return, integration and post-conflict rehabilitation.
43. We support further elaboration of practical steps aimed at implementing the decisions of the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995) and the 24th special session of the UN General Assembly, the Millennium Declaration and the Monterrey Consensus, as well as the "Copenhagen + 5", "Copenhagen + 10" documents and decisions of Summit – 2005.
It is needed to enhance the role of the UN Commission for Social Development in formulating the agreed measures on the issues related to the world social situation, population ageing, ensuring equal opportunities for persons with disabilities, improving the status of youth and strengthening the role of family.
Addressing the needs of people with disabilities is an important element of Russia's social policy. On May 3, 2012, the President of the Russian Federation signed the Federal Law on Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which reaffirmed our commitment to the full respect of the rights of persons with disabilities aimed at their fuller integration into society.
44. One of the key tasks for the international community is to ensure true gender equality and advancement of women. To achieve this goal on the global scale, all States concerned need to join their efforts to implement the decisions of the Fourth World Conference on Women, the 23rd Special Session of the UN General Assembly and other international documents on gender issues.
We reaffirm our support for the UN Commission on the Status of Women as a key forum for constructive dialogue between all regional groups of States on the crucial issues of gender equality and advancement of women.
We positively assess the beginning of active work of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women ("UN Women"), where Russia was re-elected to the Executive Board for the second term. We reiterate the need for the universal geographic coverage of its activities, comprising all groups of countries, without exception.
45. We attach special importance to the further strengthening of international cooperation to promote and protect the rights of children. We believe that the coordinated efforts of the international community in this field should build upon the provisions of the outcome document of the 27th Special Session of the UN General Assembly "A World Fit for Children".
As a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child concerning the involvement of children in armed conflicts, Russia has submitted in a timely manner the regular reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Now we finalize the internal procedures for Russia's accession to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.
46. We attach great importance to the work of this session of the UN General Assembly on a wide range of issues concerning the economic, environmental and humanitarian agendas.
We are interested in constructive collaboration with all partners for the timely implementation of international development goals, providing for global food and energy security, as well as effective countering the negative consequences of climate change and the world financial and economic crisis.
We assume that the decisions of the session will become an effective impetus for more active and coherent efforts of governments, international financial and trade institutions, business communities and NGOs as part of the follow-up of major UN social and economic forums.
47. We are interested in further broad discussion of the role of the UN in the global economic governance system. We call to focus on building the effective collaboration between the Organization and international financial and trade institutions, as well as informal associations, particularly the G20. Linking the G20 work with the priorities of the UN global social and economic agenda is an important task of the Russian presidency in the G20 in 2013.
48. We are interested in getting support, during the session, for our steps aimed at strengthening the international status of the newly established Eurasian Economic Commission.
49. We stand for enhancing the role of the UN Economic and Social Council as the central coordinating body of the UN development system and the key mechanism for the follow-up to "Rio +20". We focus on constructive cooperation with all partners during the next round of consultations on the review of progress in the implementation of resolution 61/16 of the UNGA on strengthening of ECOSOC. In our opinion, one of the priorities of the review is to streamline the agenda and the work programme of the substantive session of the Council. We support initiatives on strengthening the ECOSOC Forum for Development Cooperation as an important multilateral format ensuring the full participation of developing countries, including major fast-growing economies, and the development of conceptual approaches to assistance.
50. We intend to actively participate during the session in the discussion on expanding and enhancing the international cooperation in mobilizing adequate domestic and external resources for development, strengthening the global financial system, finding a long-term solution to the problem of external debt, and expanding the international trade.
We support the strengthening of the UN institutional mechanisms for development financing to ensure greater consistency of the follow-up to the International Conferences on Financing for Development in Monterrey and Doha. We attach particular importance to reflections, during the forthcoming session, on the establishment of the new ECOSOC functional commission for the development financing.
51. We attach great importance to the consideration of the socio-economic development of Africa during the session. We are interested in the successful work of the monitoring mechanism to assess the progress in meeting obligations by all parties dealing with Africa's development.
52. We are committed to the 2011-2020 Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). With respect to the procedure of excluding from the list of LDCs, we will abide to the criteria established by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 59/209 of 20 December 2004. However, we also assume the possibility of using a flexible approach to individual States, such as small Pacific island States, in determining their compliance with the criteria of the LDCs.
53. We are ready to continue constructive work on negotiating a new comprehensive regime for climate cooperation in accordance with the decisions of the Durban Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere cannot be achieved, unless this effort brings together all States, both developed and developing, without exception.
54. We call for further improving the efficiency of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Programme on Human Settlements (UN-Habitat), in order to implement the concept of sustainable development for the achievement of the MDGs.
55. We believe that the UN activities in the field of international humanitarian cooperation should be based on the principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence of humanitarian aid, enshrined in the GA resolutions, as well as on the consent of the government of the affected country to the provision of aid and on the respect for its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
We view the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) as key coordinating mechanisms for humanitarian operations and mobilization of financial resources.
We support the large-scale reform of the global agriculture and food security system launched at the "Rome platform" of the UN specialized agencies, including the strengthening of the mandate of the FAO as the head organization in charge of the world agricultural sector, forestry and fishery and an agricultural knowledge hub.
56. We emphasize the need for negotiating by the Member States of the initiatives by Secretary General with regard to changing the management structure and administrative aspects of the Organization.
We suggest that possible additional proposals for amendments to the UN regular budget offered beyond the budget cycle (budget of $5.15 billion approved in December 2011 for the period of 2012-2013) should be considered in the light of existing provisions concerning fiscal discipline, and a careful justification should be also required with regard to requests, taking into account the effects of the global financial crisis.
57. While considering the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping activities, given the huge amount of resources requested by the Secretariat ($7.4 billion per year) we deem it appropriate to seek reasonable savings, especially for missions whose mandates are not subject to changes.
58. We attach special importance to the participation in agreeing the UN management reform. We presume that the components of the reform - changes in personnel, procurement, information and communications equipment - will lead to greater transparency and accountability for the implementation of decisions taken by the Member States and will increase the return on resources invested in the UN. In general, the reform should not be seen as an opportunity to inflate the structure of the UN Secretariat. The main objective is to improve its efficiency.
59. We believe that multilingualism, in compliance with parity among the official languages of the UN, is one of the important principles of communication activities of the world Organization. In this context, we note the substantial progress in the implementation of this principle with regard to content of the UN website, as well as web portals of other organizations within the UN, which were improved significantly in terms of information content and user-friendliness.