Press Conference by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia dedicated to the beginning of the Russian Presidency of UNSC in February 2022
Vassily Nebenzia:
Let me give you a brief heads-up of what we are going to have this month. We started off today with a traditional Presidency breakfast, where we discussed the program of work. I must tell you that it was practically fully supported in the form in which we proposed it.
We will have some free time in the beginning of our Presidency because of the Chinese New Lunar Year, and also the opening of Winter Olympic Games in Beijing. We believe that not only wars should stop at that time, but even the Security Council should cease its work. And I hope nothing will prevent it and the celebration of this sport festival. We wish success to all international athletes, and to our Chinese friends we wish good Olympics.
We will start our work next week on Monday, 7 February, straight with our signature event – Debate on General issues relating to sanctions: preventing their humanitarian and unintended consequences. As the world today faces multiple global challenges, including the pandemic, the Security Council should ensure that the sanctions measures, imposed to maintain international peace and security, should avoid adverse humanitarian and socio-economic effects or unintended consequences, and secure the unhindered provision of food, health supplies and medical support, as outlined in the appeal of the UN Secretary-General in March 2020. We believe that members of the Security Council will take this meeting as an opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to prevent negative humanitarian and socio-economic impact of sanctions, and to consider opportunities to raise the effectiveness of exemption mechanisms.
On Wednesday, 9 February we will hold a regular briefing on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts with USG V.Voronkov and CTED acting Executive Director Weixiong Chen as briefers.
On 10 February we have adoption of SC resolution on Sudan sanctions. That’s an extension.
We will resume SC activities next week and discuss Somalia on 15 February. We plan to hear briefings by SRSG James Swan as well as representatives from the AU and EU. In the afternoon session SESG H.Grundberg will brief the Council on Yemen in person.
This brings me to our second signature event on 16 February, which is a debate on Cooperation between the UN and subregional organizations – in our case it is the Collective Security Treaty Organization – in maintaining international peace and security. We believe it is important to inform our colleagues on the activities of CSTO and on recent collective efforts of the organization to stabilize the situation in Kazakhstan and to hear briefings from CSTO Secretary-General Stanislav Zas. And I can inform you that SG Guterres expressed his willingness to brief the Security Council on that agenda item as well.
17 February will mark exactly 7 years since the adoption of SC resolution 2202 endorsing the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements on Ukraine. Unfortunately, despite statements by Ukrainian authorities that they adhere to the settlement, basically not a single move was made by Kiev to meet its obligations under the Minsk Agreements. So we most probably will discuss not the implementation of Minsk Agreements, but rather their non-implementation. We think this matter should be brought to the attention of the international community.
On 18 February we will hold briefing and consultations on Haiti. SRSG Helen La Lime will present SG’s report.
On 22 February in the morning session we will hold a briefing on the work of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic with SRSG Mankeur Ndyae as a briefer. We also expect briefers from the AU and International Conference on Great Lakes Region who will speak on their role in promoting a cease-fire initiative in the CAR.
In the afternoon session we will have a stand-alone briefing on Iraq and more precisely on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Compensation Commission. We hope that by that time this mechanism will finalize all technical formalities in Geneva and the SC will be able to approve the completion of work of the UNCC.
On 23 February we will gather to discuss the Middle East. Special Coordinator Tor Wennesland will brief us on the situation in the region with fa ocus on the situation in Palestine.
Regular briefing on Iraq with SRSG Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert is scheduled for the morning of 24 February. Later in the afternoon the SC will listen to the 751 Committee briefing as well as will hold consultations on 1718 Committee.
On the next day we will first adopt two resolutions on the 1540 Committee and 2140 Committee. Then we have scheduled a combined discussion on both Syria political and humanitarian in briefing and consultations. Perhaps, there will be the chemical file as well. We expect Geir Pedersen and Martin Griffiths, as well as someone who will address chemical aspects, to brief the Council.
As for the informal wrap-up we are thinking of 28 February, as this is the last day of the month. We will confirm the date at a later stage.
Q: Thank you, Ambassador, and we wish you the best of luck on behalf of UNCA for the busy month ahead. My question is on Ukraine. Yes, surprise. Can you elaborate on what President Putin just said about the US and NATO that have ignored Russian concerns? And also if Ukraine decides to implement the Minsk Agreements, do you think this could be a first step towards de-escalation of the situation in the area?
A: I think it is wrong to link our proposals on security guarantees and the security architecture that we made to the US and NATO and discussed with them already (both with the US and NATO, and also the OSCE), with the situation in Ukraine as it is being presented by some of our Western partners.
The European security does not boil down to the situation in Ukraine. It's a broader issue. And we see attempts to link these two things and to present it in a way as if this is a price that we are asking for the European security. These are separate issues.
Of course, Ukraine is part of Europe and part of the European security. But these things are not absolutely linked. We have presented our proposals, even draft agreements--to the US and NATO--on what we would like to see as security guarantees for Russia. We based it on the decisions that were adopted by all members of the OSCE, both the decision adopted in Istanbul in 1999 and another one adopted in Astana in 2010. Yes, they contain clauses that provide for any country to choose their ways to ensure their security and to choose the allies. But there is a related clause stating that security is indivisible and that security of one country cannot be insured at the expense of the other. And that is what our Western colleagues, in particular NATO, have been ignoring for all these years.
And finally, we raised that question straightforwardly. We received an answer from the United States. There was a misleading information that we had already sent a reply. That is not the case. Minister Lavrov just provided a clarification on what we mean by indivisibility of security for every country. It's not our reply to the US letter. Such a reply is being still prepared.
I pray the Minsk Agreements are implemented. That is what we've been crying for ever since they were adopted. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian authorities are now openly claiming and stating that the Minsk Agreements are unfulfillable, “unimplementable”, that they cannot do it, that they want to reshape them, that they want to pick and choose, to do it piecemeal. That was a package. And that is a package that would lead to the settlement of the crisis. Unless it is implemented as a package, nothing will happen.
Q: Ambassador, following up on Ukraine and the situation in Eastern Europe and the tensions. Again, you were very clear in the Security Council yesterday that there was no proof of a threat to Ukraine, no proof that there was any threat to international peace and security. So a simple question to you. Why then is there this large build-up of Russian troops, tanks and missiles? And secondly, as President of the Security Council, do you believe the current tensions might spill over into the work of the Security Council on other issues and to wider global diplomacy?
A: On your second question, I hope they will not, but tensions arise, sometimes unexpectedly. You cannot rule out anything, not just on the issue that we discussed yesterday, but on other issues as well. But I will try to do my best as President to ensure that the work of the Security Council in February goes smoothly, without tensions.
On the build-up of troops. I'm not the Minister of Defense and I cannot tell you why there is this movement of troops. However, I believe I answered your question yesterday when I said that in April there was a similar situation when there were maneuvers, exercises. The troops moved in, then they moved out. Nobody then made any fuss about it. Suddenly, today that is being presented as an imminent danger to Ukraine, although, as I said yesterday, nobody of the Russian officials said anything on that issue. On the contrary, they have always denied and continue to deny it. Minister Lavrov said recently that if that's up to Russia, there will be no war.
But I said yesterday that, again, both the [self-proclaimed] republics and others are not excluding dangerous provocations that might lead to hostilities. We know that Ukraine is being massively supplied with weapons, and these are not just defensive weapons. NATO countries are supplying those weapons and openly admitting that, although it, by the way, contradicts the Minsk Agreements as well.
When we speak about Ukraine, we say that we are concerned with many things happening in the country. In particular, that the Russian language, which is a natural language for most of the Ukrainians, is being removed from the public space. Laws have been adopted that are contrary to their obligations on that matter and so on and so forth. I would like to quote Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Alexey Danilov. He expressed opinion that using the Russian language in the world is not safe because of the position of Russia, and that is exactly the reason why I talk to you in English.
Q: Two questions. First of all, can we expect a visit from Foreign Minister Lavrov in February? And the second question is on North Korea. They appear to have fired a ballistic missile that could be of medium range. Do you think this is something that should be addressed by the Security Council and with your meeting next Monday on sanctions and humanitarian situations, what countries specifically are you thinking of? Are you thinking of North Korea? Are Russia and China planning to move forward with your resolution that's been on the table for a couple of years now to try and ease sanctions? If you could elaborate a little more on your thinking for that meeting.
A: On the first question, Minister Lavrov will not come due to his schedule. He will not be able to arrive, but we will dutifully implement all the instructions that he will send us here in February.
On North Korea, we have repeatedly and continuously called for the resumption of the dialogue in order to ease tensions in and around the Korean Peninsula. Needless to say, nobody is welcoming the moves that compromise this return to the negotiations. Negotiations have been stalled for a long time. Y
es, our humanitarian resolution is on the table. We discussed it with our colleagues in the Council. Some of them consider that it is not yet timely. But you are right, North Korea is an issue on the list and is a subject to be discussed at our meeting on February 7. But it's not alone, because the list of countries under sanctions whose population is suffering because of those sanctions, which sometimes are over implemented, is longer than North Korea.
Q: Just to follow up. So what other countries spring to mind? Who will you particularly talk about during this meeting?
A: I will not reveal which ones exactly, but you will know.
Q: Many people around the world sometimes appreciate when Russia stands against US hegemony and among them the Arab people. But only in two cases they put so much blame on Russia. When it comes to Israeli violations of the airspace and sovereignty of Syria day in and day out. And when it comes to Israeli apartheid against the Palestinians. Can Russia take a stronger stand on these two issues?
A: If you recall our statements, when we speak on the issue of the Middle East, we never miss an opportunity to note that Israeli violations of the Syrian airspace or any airspace are inadmissible. We repeat it in every statement when we speak on the Middle East.
When it comes to the rights of the Palestinians, despite our good relations with Israel, we are very straightforward with them on that issue. And not only us but most of the international community has the same position.
The situation with the Palestinians in the occupied territory is inadmissible. It should be resolved within the settlement which, let's be frank, is not on the horizon at the moment. We are very strongly advocating in favor of the resumption of the Quartet [of international mediators]. We hope, fingers crossed, since the meeting of the Quartet at the level of advisers and senior officials has been held, a meeting of the Quartet at the level of ministers is also convened. We hope that Tor Wennesland works hard on that issue. And we hope that when we discuss that on 23 February, we might hear some good news about it.
Q: Again on Ukraine. The first question is what role, if any, do you see the UN having if there's a diplomatic resolution to the crisis? The UN played a role after the Minsk Agreements and in 2015 passed a resolution to implement the Minsk Agreements, also there are UN missions. What role do you see if there is a resolution?
And the second is just a clarification of your clarification. You said just now that Moscow, your government did not respond to the US proposal. They just sent a clarification and the proposal is coming. Is that what I heard? Thank you.
A: What resolution and of what crisis do you mean? If you mean resolution of the domestic Ukrainian crisis with Donbas, that is one thing. Or are you talking about the crisis that is being artificially created today, whereby Russia is accused of creating a crisis and told that it should de-escalate?
Q: I was talking about 2202.
A: 2202 is roadmap to resolve the crisis.
Q: Is there anything like that that could come out of this crisis? That's really what I'm asking.
A: Well, that's our hope. We have two formats where this resolution is being implemented. UN is doing its humanitarian and development work both in Ukraine and in Donbas as well.
But when it comes to political and technical forms, there are two formats, as you know. That is the Normandy Format and the Minsk Group, where they discuss all the technical issues. Unfortunately, last summit of the Normandy Format took place in 2019 in Paris. Agreements were reached there, but they were not implemented. Now Ukrainian authorities and President Zelensky insist on having another summit. Our position is that until the decisions of the summit of 2019 are implemented, there is no point in meeting again.
When it comes to Minsk [Group], which is now virtual, as you know, I read a lot of reports on the meetings. There are, I think, three subgroups: political, economic and humanitarian. Not much of the public knows the details of what is happening there. I do because I read reports. Unfortunately, our Ukrainian friends are sabotaging most of the things that are to be implemented within these three tracks under various pretexts. So nothing is moving.
Everybody says (including my colleagues in the Security Council) that there is no military solution, because military solution is deadly. There is a political solution, and the political solution is framed within the Minsk Agreements that should be implemented. But how can we implement the Minsk Agreements if one party, which is a direct part of that Minsk Agreements, refuses to implement them, not just technically, but politically? They said it at the highest level that the Minsk Agreements are “unimplementable”, that they can choose certain elements out of it, but they cannot implement it in full. President Zelensky said himself that he understands that Minsk Agreements cannot be implemented but we should still stick to them, as because of that Russia is being sanctioned. So what can UN do?
On your second question about the response you are right. There is no response to the American response. It's being now coordinated between relevant ministries. It will come, of course, but the letter that was sent to US and other NATO members was a clarification of our understanding of European security how we see it.
Q: US counterpart has said that Washington is open to dialogue on Ukraine as well as in general. Yet at the same time, we're seeing US planes landing in Ukraine unloading military support, and 40 planes will be landing unloading military support in Ukraine. Furthermore, we see the sudden move from the US State Department telling diplomatic families in Belarus to evacuate. How do these moves from the United States correlate with this offer for dialogue?
A: It seems to me it was a nearly rhetorical question. It doesn't correlate indeed.
We said yesterday at a meeting that was called by the US that putting these things in the framework that they picked yesterday is like calling for a war. It was indeed a provocation. You might have noticed that the Ukrainian Ambassador spoke very moderately on that issue. President Zelensky is calling to stop panicking on that thing. Other Ukrainian officials are saying that they don't see imminent threat coming from Russia.
I don't know why the US is escalating tensions and at the same time accusing Russia of escalating tensions. We never said anything on that. This all is linked to alleged presence of Russian troops at the Russian-Ukrainian border. That is not true. Russian troops are not at the Russian-Ukrainian border. They are where they normally stay. Whether they are more than normal or less than normal or as they usually are, I have no idea. 100,000, 120,000 -- I don't know where these figures came from. Ukrainians are saying 136,000. We never announced how many troops there are. And I don't know who was counting them.
And you rightly said that they massively pump up Ukraine with armaments. It looks not only provocative, but dangerous as well. They were talking about evacuating their personnel, which is also provocative, in fact. And again, even President Zelensky was saying that it was unnecessary and that was the thing that only raised tensions.
Q: I have just a quick follow-up. You just said the number 100,000 or whatsoever is in the US and you don't know where they get it from. Can you tell us what is the number of Russian troops on the border?
And my other question or my real question is though you have a lot of differences between Russia and the US and the West on Ukraine, it seems that there are some agreement on how to deal with the issue of Iran nuclear agreement, and on the step-by-step approach by Mr. Pedersen in Syria. Can you shed some light on the agreements on those issues?
A: Which agreements?
Q: Well, it seems that you are working together on the mutual compliance by the US and Iran regarding the JCPOA. And Mr. Pederson mentioned that Russia and the US have some kind of an agreement to the step-by-step approach regarding how to solve the crisis in Syria.
A: We would like to have cooperation with the US on a much wider range of things, but it was not our choice to narrow this cooperation to only those areas where we either have joint interest or the US has an interest of its own.
After the summit of President Biden and President Putin in Geneva, there was an agreement to try to resolve the areas that became practically nonexistent in our cooperation. And we resumed dialogue on strategic stability, which moves meaningfully in a sense that there is a practical conversation between people who understand the issues that they are discussing.
We started a dialogue on cybersecurity, which had been, as you know, a tug of war between the US and Russia for a long time. But even during the Trump Administration, we were proposing to start dialogue to lay facts on the table and to try to solve our differences and to understand each other. This dialogue started under the current administration. It develops and that's a good thing. There are results that have been already achieved in that area. We also have concerns on cybersecurity and threats coming from other countries, including the US. That was openly said when that issue was discussed, so we have dialogue on that.
We have other dialogues like Iran, as you said. We are both interested in returning to JCPOA and full implementation of obligations that the members of the JCPOA took upon themselves. It's not a piece of cake today, but as far as I know, negotiations in Vienna are moving and we can, with certain caution, expect that the agreement will be reached.
We had and continue to have a dialogue on Afghanistan. You know that we have an extended Troika, which consists of Russia, US, China, and Pakistan, which is a very important instrument in dealing with issues relating to Afghanistan.
We could have a separate press conference on Ukraine because it's a vast topic. The reason we cannot agree on Ukraine is because Ukraine in fact became a geopolitical card in our relations both with the US and some Western countries. We have a feeling that the US is not interested in resolving that crisis. As I mentioned, yesterday when I spoke at the Council, when Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield was delivering her statement, she was only talking about the current crisis between Russia and Ukraine, which is, in fact, nonexistent, besides all the problems that we experience.
But she didn't mention a single word about the Minsk Agreement, a single word in her statement which is telling, in fact. If you want to resolve the crisis in Ukraine you have to genuinely engage in encouraging and even making Ukraine implement the agreements that they have signed. So that's a vast topic. Unfortunately, Ukraine became an issue that overshadowed everything else that is between us. And you know, the US is perhaps more Catholic on it than Ukrainians themselves, than the Pope. I am paraphrasing, of course.
As for how many troops are at the border, or rather not at the border but where they are stationed now, I have no idea. I don't know where this figure came from. Nobody knows how many troops there are, but these figures are presented to us as a fait accompli. We know exactly how many American troops are outside the US though. That's around 175,000. Besides, there are bases, nuclear weapons, other NATO countries which are near Russian borders, which is a concern to us as well. So that is how it is.
Q: Ambassador, are you going to ask your Defense Ministry how many troops are on the border?
A: I'm not planning to ask my Defense Ministry. The Defense Ministry speaks for itself.
Q: So you don't want to know how many troops, do you?
A: You can ask them if you want to. But I don't know why I should be asking my Defense Ministry. They have their own spokesperson and press secretaries, so they can answer that question if asked.
Q: Despite calls by many countries, including Russia, there has been no progress on unfreezing the Afghan assets to enable the authorities in Kabul to deal with the economic crisis, which is deepening to a dangerous level. As a President of the Security Council, any thoughts on this?
A: That's a relevant question. We've been advocating for a return of Afghan assets to Afghanistan because this humanitarian assistance that goes to the country will not solve the problem and will not save Afghani people. Winter is approaching, and the situation is dire.
There are issues with the Afghan assets, as you know. They are blocked by the decisions of US courts. And our US colleagues are saying that they simply legally cannot withdraw those assets and transfer them to Afghanistan. But of course, whatever they answer and whatever the courts decide, that doesn't solve the puzzle and that doesn't help Afghanistan.
It's our common priority to maintain stability in Afghanistan. We are urging Taliban to implement what they said in the beginning. We want an ethnically and confessionally inclusive government. We want stability in the country. We want fight with terrorism. We want fighting drug trafficking. Of course, we all want maintaining and observing human rights in Afghanistan, including for women and girls.
We hope that the resolution 2615 of the Security Council that was adopted in December last year would permit not only to the UN, but to the countries that are willing to assist Afghanistan, to build up their humanitarian assistance so that Afghanistan can at least survive the winter.
But the issue of unfreezing the Afghanistan assets is a very cute one. I fully agree with you.
Q: I have a follow-up on Ukraine. You cited the Ukrainian President and the Ambassador, but as a matter of fact, the Ukrainian Ambassador yesterday in the Security Council, and also after during the stakeout said that his country supported the holding the Security Council meeting and calling for it by the US. So could your comment quickly on that?
And my question is actually on Libya and the fact that the Security Council had to roll over three times within five months? Could you shed more light on that and tell us more about your country’s position. Did you get any suggestions from the SG about somebody after the resignation of Mr. Kubis? Thank you.
A: Of course, the Ukrainian Ambassador supported the meeting that the US called because it fully reflects the narrative that the Ukrainian authorities are maintaining on that issue. No surprises here. I hope he will also support our meeting on 17 February, on the implementation of Minsk agreements. Of course, I am sure that he would like to come and make a statement, and he would be most welcome to do that.
On Libya. Yesterday we adopted a resolution to extend the mandate of UNSMIL for three months. The reason for us is very simple. There is a provision of the resolution which refers back to the previous resolution that the Secretary-General should appoint the new SRSG for Libya without delay. And the time frame is more or less the end of April when the contract of Stephanie Williams expires. By that time, we expect that we have the name which will have been agreed by the Security Council, and we will have the new SRG starting May, which will be good.
They will have a full-fledged mission to be based in Tripoli. It will engage in further political process, in forthcoming elections, which also have to happen without delay. But that is not for the SRSG to decide. That is for the Libyans to decide. His or her job would be to make them agree on the dates and on the format. We believe that this election should be inclusive, everybody should be given an opportunity to participate, and then we hope that the political process and the settlement will move forward.
Q: Yesterday during your remarks, you mentioned “megaphone diplomacy”. It seems like it's not only about Ukraine, this issue. There are many issues, like Syria. Everybody is talking about different sides and installments. What do you really think of the megaphone diplomacy? And as the President of the Security Council, what would you do to really deal with issues rather than use megaphones?
A: Yesterday was a perfect example of this so called megaphone diplomacy that was not about resolving the issue. It rather sought to attract attention and present a version which has nothing to do with reality. That was also an issue of domestic politics, as you understand, because that had been prepared long before the meeting started. We protested and took it for the procedural voting. We did it not because we were afraid of a discussion, but because we thought that it was not about the real issues, but about fake things that were invented.
On the megaphone diplomacy. If I hear something like this during my presence, I will not be able to stop the speaker who uses megaphone diplomacy. But I hope that we would be able to avoid it in February and later on. We've said many times that members of the Security Council should avoid naming and shaming, that we should be more engaged in pragmatic things and pragmatic solutions. And in fact, as I said many times over the past years, Security Council reaches agreements on most of the issues it discusses. But you only ask about the issues which are a tug of war or which are on the radar.I understand that you are Media and are interested in hot facts. But the Security Council operates. Sometimes what it does is left behind the scenes, and is not very much on the front pages.
Q: Two questions, a quick follow-up on Ukraine. The US and EU are also talking about sanctions in case of Russian aggression on Ukraine. If there were any sanctions, how would Russia respond? And my second question will be on Syria. Do you expect the Syrian Constitutional Committee to meet in Geneva this month?
A: On sanctions. Point 1: we've been sanctioned so many times that we lost count. Point 2: they threaten us with so called horrific or hell sanctions. And the most ironic thing about it is that they now are talking about sanctions before anything happens -- preventive sanctions.
Yesterday I saw Senator Menendez saying in the Senate that Russia should be punished because it has bad intentions. As I saw in some statements, Ukrainian officials are very much welcoming that.
Here I recall one fun thing. The Russian side, including Minister Lavrov, has repeatedly said (that was back during Poroshenko’s time, but the situation hasn’t changed): “The paradox is that Ukraine is not implementing Minks Agreements, but Russia is being punished for it.” So we’ve been with this for a long time already ,we have learned to live with that. If implemented, it will not harm Russia only. I hope that they will have enough reason not to go forward with it. Otherwise it will backfire. And of course, we will respond. How we will respond, I will not betray at the moment.
On the Constitutional Committee, we will hear from Geir Pedersen on 25 February at the meeting on Syria. He will inform us how the preparation for the next round of the Constitutional Committee is going.
Q: Two quick follow-ups and then a question. First, you said that the ministries are preparing a response to the US letter. How soon will that be expected? And in your two signature events, are you expecting any outcome documents?
And my question is about Myanmar. Today is the first anniversary of the Myanmar coup. There have been several UN officials who lamented that the UN Security Council has taken no action to address this. As I'm sure you've read, there were protests and strikes today, and some officials have said that the conflict is quickly sliding into civil war. I wonder if you could address Russia's view on that issue.
A: No, the response to the US response has not been yet finalized. Press Secretary of the President as well as Minister Lavrov who today had a telephone conversation with Secretary of State said that it is in the pipeline. Of course, it will come. On signature events -- no outcome.
On Myanmar I cannot tell you whether it's sliding down to a civil war or not. Of course, we are all looking to resolving that thing peacefully. But only the people of Myanmar can do it. We count on the diplomatic efforts which the current ASEAN Chair is taking. You know that we have a new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General who started to engage on Myanmar and I don't know whether I would betray a secret to you or not, but Security Council is working on the product on Myanmar as we speak.
Q: What product?
A: Look, I may tell you one thing and the it may become another. I don't want to be a liar. Let's wait. Don't rush things.
Q: Yesterday during your remarks, you mentioned “megaphone diplomacy”. It seems like it's not only about Ukraine, this issue. There are many issues, like Syria. Everybody is talking about different sides and installments. What do you really think of the megaphone diplomacy? And as the President of the Security Council, what would you do to really deal with issues rather than use megaphones?
A: Yesterday was a perfect example of this so called megaphone diplomacy that was not about resolving the issue. It rather sought to attract attention and present a version which has nothing to do with reality. That was also an issue of domestic politics, as you understand, because that had been prepared long before the meeting started. We protested and took it for the procedural voting. We did it not because we were afraid to discuss the issue, but because we thought that it was not about the real issues, but about fake things that were invented.
On the megaphone diplomacy. If I hear something like this during my Presidency, I will not be able to stop the speaker who uses megaphone diplomacy. But I hope that we would be able to avoid it in February and later on. We've said many times that members of the Security Council should avoid naming and shaming, that we should be more engaged in pragmatic things and pragmatic solutions. And in fact, as I said many times over the past years, Security Council reaches agreements on most of the issues it discusses. But you only ask about the issues which are a tug of war or which are on the radar. I understand that you are Media and are interested in hot facts. But the Security Council operates. Sometimes what it does is left behind the scenes, and is not very much on the front pages.
Q: Two questions, a quick follow-up on Ukraine. The US and EU are also talking about sanctions in case of Russian aggression on Ukraine. If there were any sanctions, how would Russia respond? And my second question will be on Syria. Do you expect the Syrian Constitutional Committee to meet in Geneva this month?
A: On sanctions. Point 1: we've been sanctioned so many times that we lost count. Point 2:They threaten us with so called horrific or hell sanctions. And the most ironic thing about it is that they now are talking about sanctions before anything happens -- preventive sanctions.
Yesterday I heard Senator Menendez saying in the Senate that Russia should be punished because it has bad intentions. As I saw in some statements, Ukrainian officials are very much welcoming that.
Here I recall one fun thing. The Russian side, including Minister Lavrov, has repeatedly said (that was back during Poroshenko’s time, but the situation hasn’t changed): “The paradox is that Ukraine is not implementing the Minsk Agreements, but Russia is being punished for it.” So we’ve been with this for a long time already, we have learned to live with that. If implemented, it will not harm Russia only. I hope that they will have enough reason to not go forward with it. Otherwise it will backfire. And of course, we will respond. How we will respond, I will not betray at the moment.
On the Constitutional Committee, we will hear from Geir Pedersen on 25 February at the meeting on Syria. He will inform us how the preparation for the next round of the Constitutional Committee is going.
Q: Two quick follow-ups and then a question. First, you said that the ministries are preparing a response to the US letter. How soon will that be expected? And in your two signature events, are you expecting any outcome documents?
And my question is about Myanmar. Today is the first anniversary of the Myanmar coup. There have been several UN officials who lamented that the UN Security Council has taken no action to address this. As I'm sure you've read, there were protests and strikes today, and some officials have said that the conflict is quickly sliding into civil war. I wonder if you could address Russia's view on that issue.
A: No, the response to the US response has not been yet finalized. Press Secretary of the President as well as Minister Lavrov who today had a telephone conversation with Secretary of State said that it is in the pipeline. Of course, it will come. On signature events -- no outcome.
On Myanmar I cannot tell you whether it's sliding down to a civil war or not. Of course, we are all looking to resolving that thing peacefully. But only the people of Myanmar can do it. We count on the diplomatic efforts which the current ASEAN Chair is taking. You know that we have a new Special Envoy of the Secretary-General who started to engage on Myanmar and I don't know whether I would betray a secret to you or not, but Security Council is working on the product on Myanmar as we speak.
Q: What product?
A: Look, I may tell you one thing and the it may become another. I don't want to be a liar. Let's wait. Don't rush things.
Q (as translated from Russian): A question about the Minsk Agreeements. It seems obvious to all, and it has been said repeatedly at the United Nations that the Minsk Agreements are the only diplomatic solution to the conflict in Donbas. Ukrainian high-ranking officials openly confess that Ukraine is not going to observe them. At the same time, Western states are pumping up Ukraine with armaments. In this context, what exactly are you going to discuss on 17 February? Of course, “megaphone diplomacy” is not the preferred method, but what is the point discussing the issue in the existing format if everyone got accustomed to the fact the Minsk Agreements is something that is not implemented?
A (as translated from Russian): First of all, it will be the seventh anniversary of the signing. We raise this at the Security Council every year so that to draw the Council’s and the global attention to the fact that Ukraine first consistently sabotaged the Minsk Agreements, and now it openly defies them. It is the non-implementation of the Minsk Agreements that we will address, rather than the issues of their implementation.
There are insistent attempts to present Russia as a side to the Minsk Agreements and make us implement them. To that – we keep referring our colleagues to the text of the Minsk Agreements and the Minsk Package. They does not say a word about Russia. All obligations are only envisaged for Kiev and Donbas. No one would listen though. But as the proverb goes, repetition is the mother of learning. So I think we need to raise this issue again and call our partners and their Ukrainian protégés to get back to the Agreements. Because there is no other way out of that conflict. And the more time passes, the farther Donbas from Kiev.
Q (as translated from Russian): You say Ukraine plays along with the US foreign policy. Is it probably time to raise the Minsk Agreements not with the Ukrainians, but with those who realyy make decisions?
A (as translated from Russian): We talk to our US colleagues, and we call them to influence their Ukrainian protégés, to put it mildly. But American understanding of the Minsk Agreements and the situation around Ukraine is perhaps even more distorted that that of our colleagues in the Normandy Format.
Thank you. I'll be seeing you often during this month. Fortunately, I have no other choice.
