Statement by Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation Vladimir Ermakov at the General Debate in the First Committee of the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly
Madam Chair,
I would like to congratulate you on your election to this post and to wish you every success in your work. Please be assured that the Russian delegation will offer you its utmost support in facilitating substantive discussions.
The reality is that, over the past year, the situation with international security and strategic stability, far from stabilizing, has continued to deteriorate at a frustrating pace. The conflicts that flared up earlier are escalating in a spiral; tension zones are expanding, and new crises threaten to break out. Most dangerously, confrontation involving States with military nuclear capabilities is increasing.
At the same time, there seems to be hardly any mutual willingness to engage in political and diplomatic work towards de-escalation and settlement of interstate dispute based on equality, mutual respect for the core interests of the parties and the principle of indivisible security. There is no political will to jointly address the root causes of fundamental contradictions, which is essential for a reliable and long-term decrease in conflict potential.
This is not about individual hotspots: the situation is deteriorating on a global scale. And the underlying reason is the struggle over a future model of the world order, which has dramatically intensified. The objectively imminent transition to multi-polarity is being fiercely hampered by the US‑led West unwilling to give up its hegemonic ambitions. For the sake of maintaining global dominance, Washington and its satellites are willingly running the most serious risks of strategic nature by attempting to dramatically undermine the security of the opposing States. Among them are states which, like the United States, possess military nuclear capabilities. The blatant forceful pressure on the part of the West is fraught with catastrophic consequences.
This is most evident in the extremely dangerous course taken by the US and its accomplices, which is to further escalate the Ukraine crisis with a view to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia and suppress its input into establishing a just world order. At the same time, the West is blatantly and cynically blocking any prospects for a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the conflict around Ukraine. It is confirmed by the endorsement of the official position proclaiming that Kiev's path to NATO is irreversible, while this destructive idea largely led to the current crisis.
The aggregate military budget of NATO countries has already exceeded half of the global budget, and continues to grow. The West aims to ensure an uncontested military superiority that would underpin the diktat of force. As part of these efforts, the US and its accomplices further undermine regional and global security by implementing destabilizing strategic military programmes. Year by year, we have to remind at the First Committee about such negative factors as Washington's work to develop the global missile defence system combined with the build-up of high-precision non-nuclear weapons for disarming and decapitating strikes; forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe; the US' preparations for placing weapons in outer space and the transfer of armed conflicts to outer space. The most recent example is Washington's embarking on practical steps to deploy its ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in Europe and the Asia Pacific, which would require compensatory countermeasures on the part of a number of countries including Russia.
In these circumstances, attempts to implement any disarmament initiatives run up against harsh politico-military and strategic realities that hamper such endeavours. Yet, the proponents of such ideas are often eager to act with utter disregard for the international security situation. This includes, inter alia, efforts to accelerate nuclear disarmament processes without taking into account the fundamental principle of undiminished security for all. Russia cannot support such a flawed and counterproductive approach.
The disruption of the existing arms control and nuclear non-proliferation system affects the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Not only do the issues related to the NPT implementation remain unresolved, but they also keep growing. Under these circumstances, ensuring the sustainability of the Treaty is a priority for maintaining global stability.
The NPT's key problem is that for a long time, Western countries have used it to achieve their political goals which have nothing to do with nuclear non-proliferation, i.e.: exerting political pressure or justifying for direct military interventions against "out-of-favour" countries and the overall tightening of the control over the nuclear programmes of the states that are not part of the Western bloc. Such actions by Western states aiming to impose their vision of the global world order and implement their own aspirations are unacceptable.
The NPT verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system, is a core component of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and an important factor in ensuring the sustainability and the viability of the Treaty. The Russian Federation supports the Agency's work in this area and advocates for providing an objective, depoliticized and technically sound safeguards mechanism in strict compliance with the agreements and the protocols to them concluded between states and the IAEA. While acknowledging the importance of the universalization of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, we believe that such commitments should be voluntary and that accession to the Additional Protocol should not be imposed as a mandatory measure or some kind of a "golden standard" for verification.
We would like to address specifically the situation with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Back in 1999, the US Senate refused to ratify the CTBT under far-fetched pretexts, and since then Washington has failed to take any practical steps to move forward in the right direction. We regard as an empty excuse the reasoning that the ratification of the Treaty cannot make it through the Senate. We have concluded that Washington is not interested in joining the CTBT.
Russia's decision to revoke its ratification of the Treaty was a logical response to the aforementioned destructive actions by the United States. Russia remains a full-fledged party to the CTBT, has recently completed its International Monitoring System segment and is ready to reconsider the matter of the ratification of the Treaty as soon as the US changes its mind.
Madam Chair,
Crises in international affairs, exacerbated by negative trends in international security, directly affect the functioning of international institutions in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ACDN). In recent years, the US and its allies have embarked on a policy of subordinating these institutions to a certain "order" based on the "rules", which are made up by Western countries themselves. A vivid example of this policy is the unacceptable situation within the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), where balanced dialogue and the search for compromise have been superseded by the practice of pushing decisions through voting, using the OPCW against individual countries, and the US and the US-led group of countries' imposing their will on the entire world community.
In fact, the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation has been turned into an instrument of political pressure on "undesirable" actors, against whom unsubstantiated allegations are being multiplied. All of this undermines the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) regime, causing irreparable damage to the work and reputation of the Organisation.
Russia, as one of the founders of the CWC, has consistently supported its strengthening. We will continue our efforts to put the work of the OPCW back on a depoliticised and technical track.
The legitimate questions officially raised by the Russian Federation concerning the revealed facts of the US and Ukraine's military and biological activity on Ukrainian territory in violation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) remain unanswered. This unacceptable situation needs to be addressed and confirms the urgency of strengthening the BTWC.
First and foremost, efforts to develop a universal legally binding protocol that would cover all the BTWC articles and provide for an effective mechanism to verify its implementation, should be resumed. We expect that the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention established by the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC will contribute to this end. The Russian initiatives to create mobile biomedical units and a Scientific Advisory Committee, to update confidence-building measures and establish a BTWC mechanism to investigate possible violations of the Convention also seek to strengthen the BTWC institutional framework.
The UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM) needs to be strengthened, including by bringing up to date the principles and procedures, which have not been updated since their approval in 1990. Last year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov sent a message to United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres calling for a review of the existing UNSGM principles and procedures with a view to updating them. The Joint Statement in Support of the Efforts to Strengthen the UNSGM initiated by Russia and made on behalf of a group of countries in the First Committee of the 78th UNGA session and at the Meeting of the States Parties to the BTWC (Geneva, 11‑13 December 2023) contains a similar call. We hope that the UN Secretary-General will promptly proceed with the review with the help of expert consultants and taking into account the proposals from Member States. We are committed to most actively contribute to this work.
Madam Chair,
For decades, the Russian Federation has advocated maintaining outer space exclusively for peaceful use by states on an equal footing for the benefit of all mankind. This goal can only be achieved by developing universally recognized legally binding norms of international law that would be comprehensive and aim to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS), as set forth in the decisions of the First Special Session of the UN GA devoted to Disarmament held in 1978.
The international community needs to take urgent and decisive action against the intensifying efforts by US-led Western countries to implement their policy of space weaponization and the use of outer space for warfare with a view to ensuring their dominance and superiority. We need to start working on a legally-binding instrument on PAROS with safeguards to prevent the placement of any kind of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against or by means of outer space objects. We see the Draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space facilities proposed by Russia and China as a basis for such an instrument.
We welcome the successful outcomes of the Russia-initiated UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on PAROS and its substantive report adopted by consensus, which is an important contribution to international progress towards this instrument and to ensuring outer space security and PAROS as a whole. We expect that the GGE's contribution and its outcome document will give strong positive impetus to multilateral efforts on outer space security and facilitate an early launch of negotiations on a specialized multilateral legally-binding instrument. According to the conclusions and recommendations contained in the GGE's report, it is designed to provide a basis for the elaboration of the mentioned instrument and further efforts on PAROS. We call on all Member States and UN line bodies and entities to examine the report and continue their work on substantive elements for an international legally-binding instrument on PAROS, including, in particular, the prevention of the placement of any kind of weapons in outer space.
The international initiative/political commitment on no first placement of weapons in outer space (NFP) is an interim confidence-building measure that is now the only effective instrument that keeps outer space free of weapons. More than 30 states fully participate in this initiative. We welcome Mali joining the initiative. We expect the number of full-fledged participants in the NFP to increase in the near future. We call on the Member States to step up efforts to globalize this political commitment.
We introduce the draft resolutions on the NFP, transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (TCBMs) and further practical measures on PAROS to the First Committee for consideration. We hope for their maximal support and co-sponsorship.
We welcome the consensus agreement on the establishment after 2025 of a single-track permanent mechanism in this area, reached within the framework of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on international information security in July. It is also crucial that key elements of the future body – the principle of consensus and the possibility of future elaboration of legally binding obligations in the digital area – have been agreed upon. The major goal is to fix these decisions in a single 79th UNGA document. We expect the adoption of the Singapore draft resolution, which endorses the outcomes of the eighth OEWG session and calls on states to focus on the finalization of all the modalities of the future body strictly within the Group’s framework before its mandate expires.
Madam Chair,
We note the growing politicization of discussions on the ACDN within the UN General Assembly, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD). We are witnessing the abandonment of substantive dialogue and the persistent attempts by Western countries to turn these bodies into an instrument of pressure on the "undesirable countries", to erode their mandate of those bodies and to revise the rules of procedure and the fundamental principles of their functioning. This hinders the adoption of balanced, mutually acceptable decisions.
The ongoing unlawful visa refusals by the US authorities to the leading experts of the Russian delegation are a significant counterproductive factor in the work of the First Committee. Washington flagrantly violates its obligations under the 1947 Agreement regarding the UN Headquarters and disregards a number of key provisions of UNGA resolution A/RES/78/116. We call on the United States to show responsibility and take measures to address the situation in order to fulfill its own obligations to ensure an unhindered and indiscriminate access of representatives of all Member States to the UN Headquarters. Until this is done, the usual work of the First Committee is not possible.
At the same time, we note that if Member States have the necessary political will, they will be able to achieve meaningful results in the ACDN field. This was clearly confirmed by the approval of the UNDC agenda for the three-year cycle, which includes the traditional item on nuclear disarmament and a new item on promising technologies in the context of ACDN and international security, as well as the establishment of the five CD subsidiary bodies.
Our initiative to elaborate an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism within the CD, which meets the current demands of the international community, is also aimed at establishing unifying collective principles. We believe that its implementation would contribute to overcoming the stagnation of work at the CD on the basis of common interests.
For our part, we have been consistently promoting a unifying agenda. We introduce the resolution on Strengthening and Developing the System of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Treaties and Agreements. We hope it will have a positive effect contributing to constructive cooperation on the entire range of issues of international peace and security. We look forward to mutually acceptable decision-making.
Thank you.
