Statement by a Representative of the delegation of the Russian Federation Svetlana Surchina at the thematic debate on Cluster 1: Nuclear Weapons in the First Committee of the 79th Session of the UNGA
Madam Chair,
The Cluster on Nuclear Weapons is traditionally the most debated one in the First Committee. Moreover, the international community keeps getting more and more fragmented and differences continue to increase on these issues. This manifests itself not just in voting results, including separate votes, on relevant draft resolutions, but also in the multiplication of such documents and their splintering into sub-topics. More than evident is the lack of willingness to engage in a dialogue with a view to reach consensus decisions that would take into account interests of all parties. It is clear that such an approach based on the methods of traditional diplomacy requires a lot of work, patience and time. However, it is the only way to ensure universality, sustainability and feasibility of the solutions found.
Instead, some States opt for politicization or radicalization of discussions, exerting pressure on those who do not agree, and trying to force their way through the General Assembly vote for the sake of legitimising their sometimes quite controversial initiatives. This means that, in essence, the authority of the UN General Assembly is misused as a cover-up for the unwillingness to work on reaching a broad consensus. But this is a dead-end: rather than facilitating progress, such approaches only hinder the truly interested, mutually respectful and inclusive discussion of the accumulated problems that would lead to their resolution in a step-by-step fashion.
We continue to point out that the inseparable interrelation between the state of affairs on the disarmament track on one hand and military, political and strategic realities on the other hand is one of the factors that is chronically underestimated and missed in discussions. We believe that ignoring this interdependence can devaluate any road map leading to further nuclear weapon reductions and ultimately to a nuclear-free world.
This year we have emphasized this problem within the NPT process which in terms of international law remains our central reference point for nuclear disarmament. However, the regular session of the 2026 Review Conference Preparatory Committee has shown that many States refuse to adjust their disarmament initiatives to the international security environment which is unanimously considered deplorable. Such stand is often demonstrated at other specialised multilateral fora as well.
Russia is firmly committed to the approaches, which are enshrined in the NPT provisions, as well as in consensus documents of previous Treaty review cycles, and which stipulate that nuclear disarmament should be considered as an integral part of the general and complete disarmament and that steps leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international peace and stability, and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all.
We consistently insist on the continuing relevance of these understandings. There are no feasible alternatives. The concepts of a "shortcut" to a nuclear-free world, including by immediately declaring nuclear weapons an illegitimate means to ensure security, are no option. We continue to regard such initiatives, among them the TPNW, as counterproductive: rather than facilitating practical measures to reach "nuclear zero," they additionally provoke further split among the NPT States Parties.
We also consider "isolated" elaboration of some "reference" measures with regard to transparency of nuclear arsenals or nuclear disarmament verification as stillborn. These issues cannot be seriously addressed in isolation from negotiations on specific future arms control and disarmament agreements. Similarly, both nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament cannot be separated from the developments in the world and "compartmentalized" from integrated dialogue on the interrelated issues of strategic stability. Beside that, in the context of the former Russia-US arms control interaction, we keep in mind that the hard-won system of relevant interconnected agreements has been mostly destroyed by Washington's direct or indirect devastating actions. Today, the United States, obsessed by the wishful "strategic defeat" of Russia, shows no readiness to engage in a truly comprehensive and equal-footed strategic dialogue based on respect for our core security interests.
Effective reduction and, ultimately, complete, transparent and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons can only be achieved in a military and political atmosphere conducive to these processes and on the basis of a consensus and well-balanced step-by-step approach. Engagement of all countries possessing military nuclear capabilities is needed to reach a significant progress on this track.
The objective reality is that under current conditions Russia still needs nuclear deterrence to respond to specific and extremely serious external threats. Moreover, the build-up of such threats made Russia to adjust its doctrinal policy provisions to reinforce deterrence. Meanwhile, the circumstances of self-defence, where Russia reserves the right to a nuclear response, are still outlined very strictly.
We expect that this step would cool off those hot heads in the Western capitals who are trying to teeter on the brink of a direct armed conflict between nuclear powers. In this context we reiterate that provocative and extremely risky policy of the United States and its allies aimed at radically undermining Russia's security runs counter political obligations under which nuclear powers should prevent nuclear war by avoiding any military confrontation among them while respecting and acknowledging each other’s security interests and concerns.
We have repeatedly recounted in detail all military programs implemented by the US and their allies that pose serious strategic risks, raising the nuclear danger and keeping the prospects of nuclear disarmament at distance. Today we would like to particularly point out to the destabilizing practice of the so-called NATO’s "nuclear sharing" based on the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Under the present circumstances, the ability of NATO countries to quickly hit critical targets on the territory of Russia and its allies with these weapons, new qualitative characteristics added to these capabilities, as well as calls to geographically expand their deployment multiply several-fold the negative impact on strategic stability, necessitating compensatory countermeasures. US nuclear weapons should be completely withdrawn to its national territory with the relevant infrastructure in Europe dismantled.
Washington's steps to replicate similar schemes in other parts of the world, where the United States has already been pursuing the so-called "extended nuclear deterrence," also have a destructive impact on regional and global security. In particular, the US and Republic of Korea's joint "nuclear planning" together with the stated intent to involve Japan in this format raise deep concerns. This escalates the situation in the Asia Pacific and fuels the arms race. Tensions are also aggravated by Washington's active efforts to allocate strategic platforms to the region, including operational and potential nuclear weapon delivery means, and by its plans to transfer advanced systems that can carry nuclear weapons to the allies.
Absent the conditions for a fruitful dialogue with the West, Russia continues to implement a number of still relevant measures to reduce nuclear danger and maintain an acceptable level of predictability and stability in the nuclear missile area. This includes, inter alia, voluntary compliance with the "ceilings" on relevant weapons within the duration of the suspended New START Treaty and continued commitment to a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. However, these efforts could also become irrelevant due to the Washington's destabilizing policy aimed at achieving the decisive military-strategic superiority. In particular, we will be compelled to respond to the deployment of US ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles that pose a threat to us.
Madam Chair,
The Russian Federation regards the NPT as a cornerstone of the international security system. The three well-balanced pillars of the Treaty – nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – are a unique Treaty's feature that has once enabled its conclusion and ensured its almost universal nature. There should be no artificial bias towards any of these elements. This first of all concerns nuclear disarmament.
The NPT regime has been facing significant challenges over the recent years and the States Parties have increasingly been divided over the implementation of the Treaty. The number of issues with the implementation of its provisions has steadily been growing. The draft outcome documents of two previous Treaty review cycles were blocked.
In the first case, this was done by the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom; in the second case, we witnessed an ugly show when the Western countries filled the document with wording that was obviously unsuitable and irrelevant to the NPT and inevitably led to its blocking. The Treaty's review process was in fact trapped by the promotion of the political agenda that could have the most devastating effect on the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Russia considers the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) to be an important instrument of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and regional and international security and stability. When joining the relative protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, Russia provides security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (negative security assurances, NSA) to the participants in such zones.
Russia has signed and ratified protocols to existing treaties establishing NWFZs in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), and Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk), thus providing more than one hundred States Parties to these nuclear-weapon-free zones with assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. When acceding to such protocols, Russia traditionally makes reservations, which are of a clarifying nature and do not affect the interests of States that follow the "letter and spirit" of the NWFZ treaties in good faith.
The situation around the AUKUS partnership established by the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, when it cannot be ruled out that military infrastructure of nuclear powers may appear in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty of Rarotonga, justifies clarifying reservations to protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties.
Russia has consistently advocated for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of WMDs and their delivery systems. As a co-sponsor of the 1995 Resolution adopted at the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, our country has made every effort to reach a compromise between the supporters of the zone and its sceptics. We are convinced that establishment of a zone free of WMDs and their delivery systems would promote further strengthening of peace and stability both in the Middle East and the entire world.
Russia was actively engaged in the elaboration of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and was one of the first States to sign and ratify it in 2000. For a long 23 years, Russia has been patiently waiting for the United States to take a similar step. We have tirelessly urged it to reconsider its negative attitude to the Treaty, but Washington has taken no action to address the issue positively.
Taking into account these circumstances and the current political situation, our country has considered inadmissible the imbalance in approaches to the CTBT that we had with the United States which pursues an anti-Russian policy and aspires to inflict a "strategic defeat" on the Russian Federation.
Our withdrawal of ratification of the Treaty makes it possible to rectify this situation. We emphasize that it is the withdrawal of ratification we are talking about. Russia remains a State Signatory to the CTBT, with all the rights and obligations arising therefrom, and continues its full participation in the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization. Our country will continue to observe the moratorium on nuclear tests imposed by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation back in 1992. We have completed our national segment of the CTBT International Monitoring System in December 2023.
Thank you.
