Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
russiaun.ru

We would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening today’s meeting. We note that the delegation of Venezuela is making an important contribution to the work of the Security Council in the area of sanctions. We listened closely to the statements delivered by the representatives of Sweden and Chile.

By definition, the goal of improving the effectiveness of the working methods of the Security Council is important, in particular as it pertains to the Council’s responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. We are open to proposals to increase the transparency of the activities of the subsidiary bodies, but relevant steps should be carefully balanced so as not to create the opposite effect, which would reduce their flexibility in carrying out their functions.

Given the heavy workload of the sanctions committees, in our view it will be difficult to increase the intensiveness of consultations with interested parties and the frequency of the briefings by chairs, while ensuring the dissemination of relevant information in international media. A heavier workload should not create an obstacle for Committees in carrying out their primary responsibilities, which are to support the work of the sanctions mechanisms.

In light of the specific focus of the sanctions committees, we are not sure that convening open briefings would enhance their effectiveness. That matter will have to be carefully addressed so as to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of sanctionsrelated activities. We also question the proposals to publish reports and even verbatim records of the Committees’ meetings. That would essentially transfer the Committees’ work into an open format, which could negatively impact the effectiveness of their work and turn sanctions into a tool for bringing political pressure to bear. We insist that the consequences of sanctions regimes must be carefully analysed as they are being drawn up. It is crucial that we do not ignore the fact that sanctions cannot be a means in and of themselves; they have their own objectives, which are to ensure lasting political solutions.

We think that talk about broadening the Ombudsperson’s powers is dangerous. In our view, the mandate of that Office, established by a unanimous vote on resolution 2253 (2015), provides for an optimal level of transparency and fairness, and that any further measures would only end up watering down the Security Council’s counter-terrorism sanctions regime. We are prepared to give careful consideration to any constructive ideas for optimizing the activities of the Council’s subsidiary bodies, but we reiterate our opposition to the creation of additional bureaucratic layers, whether intergovernmental or at the level of the Secretariat, not to mention the possibility of assigning them the function of reviewing existing Security Council committees. If that happens, it will result in a great many administrative and bureaucratic obstacles and very little effectiveness and efficiency.

Within the United Nations, as an intergovernmental organization, the prerogative of making decisions must rest exclusively with sovereign States. The business of improving the working methods of its subsidiary organs requires a professional approach. The parameters for the functioning of each individual committee are unique and specific to the issues it examines, and therefore we should not attempt to universalize the principles of the work of the sanctions committees. What is useful in some areas could be counter-productive in others.

There can be no doubt that the Security Council would benefit from a degree of democratization of its work, which would produce a more equitable distribution of duties for informal work on its various dossiers through the so-called penholders. Unfortunately, at the moment, some Council members abuse that right, regarding various countries or even regions as their property and themselves as mentors on certain issues. We do not have to look very far to find examples of that. The lines for yesterday’s vote on resolution 2265 (2016)), on the Sudan, were drawn up by the United States last week, and led to disagreement in the Council.

We are ready for constructive discussion of ways of increasing the effectiveness of the Security Council’s subsidiary bodies. We think it would be helpful to turn to the under-utilized and regrettably half-forgotten mechanism of the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions. There was a time when the Working Group contributed significantly to increasing the effectiveness of the Security Council’s efforts in the area of political and diplomatic settlements of crises around the world, and especially in the maintenance of global security.