Statement by Chargé d'Affaires a.i. Dmitry Polyanskiy at a UNSC Open Debate on Maritime security
Mr. President,
We would like to greet you as president of today's meeting,
Mr. President,
We are grateful for convening this meeting on such an important issue as maritime security. We would like to thank the briefers for the information provided. Challenges and threats at sea are becoming increasingly diverse in nature. Some of them, including piracy and the nexus between crime and international terrorism, do indeed fall under the remit of the Security Council.
The proactive action taken by the UNSC in line with its central role, including the adoption on December 16, 2008, of Resolution 1851 on establishing the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, helped, in general, to curb the phenomenon of rampant piracy in the 21st century. There were also measures undertaken to strengthen the maritime law enforcement capabilities in a number of regional states, with dozens of pirates detained and brought to justice. The Russian Federation was actively involved in these efforts – we provided our naval forces to escort civilian vessels and participated in work of relevant regional formats.
At the same time, acts of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea continue to cause serious concern. A number of such incidents have been compounded by taking Russian sailors hostage. In order to enhance the combat readiness and technological equipment of the coast guard forces of the countries in the region, we are scaling up financial assistance from the Russian Federation's annual voluntary contribution to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
As regards terrorism at sea, it is extremely rare in its pure form. The only high-profile terrorist attack of this kind in recent times was the sabotage of the Russian gas pipelines Nord Stream 1 and 2 in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. This incident became possible, as we all understand, only given the frenzied anti-Russian stance of the previous US administration under Joe Biden, and, without any doubts, it created serious risks for international peace and security. At the same time, any attempts of ours to initiate an independent international investigation into this criminal act or adopt other measures through the Security Council have been repeatedly blocked by its Western members, which makes us question the circumstances surrounding the preparation and implementation of this terrorism attack. In support of their position, they referred, as we all recall, to their total faith in the national investigations conducted by Germany, Denmark, and Sweden – they expressed upstream their boundless confidence that the investigation would be effective and credible. As is well known, the “effective” investigations conducted by Denmark and Sweden ended with zero results. The German authorities, meanwhile, are still dragging their feet and persistently refusing to provide substantive information on the progress of the investigation to both the Security Council and the international community as a whole, which is stirring up various speculations and completely implausible versions in the international media. Nonetheless, whatever is done by Berlin and all those who are artificially preventing the publication of the results of the German investigation, the truth will come out, and all perpetrators will be identified and held accountable.
Mr. President,
Moving on to the issue of maritime crime, we would like to emphasize that this does not fall under the remit of the Security Council. This issue should be dealt with by other specialized international bodies. In particular, developing a unified approach to combating organized crime in general, including its “maritime component,” is the purview of the General Assembly and ECOSOC subsidiary bodies, in particular the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. To date, these bodies have developed an impressive body of decisions on various aspects of combating transnational crime. In addition, there has been established a whole system of specialized organizations, including INTERPOL, whose Secretary General is present in this chamber today. This system has been running smoothly, enhancing the effectiveness of international cooperation in addressing this kind of threats.
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of bilateral cooperation in the form of mutual legal assistance on criminal cases. Without this, it would hardly be possible to tackle transnational crime. It is extremely important that this mechanism functions on a clear and predictable basis, without politicization or double standards. As we are well aware, today there are serious problems with this. Requests from relevant Russian authorities are not met by most Western countries, even in cases where this is clearly stipulated in the relevant international treaties or Security Council resolutions. This is done purely for political reasons. As a result, it is transnational criminals who win, enjoying complete impunity.
The concept note for today's meeting mentions climate change. We would like to stress that monitoring climate change, developing response measures, and measures to adapt to it do not fall under the remit of the Security Council either. There are specialized mechanisms established for this purpose, which are premised on relevant international legal instruments, primarily the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. We deem attempts to use environmental issues as a pretext for strengthening security measures as unacceptable. All in all, we have to note that the issue of climate change is increasingly being taken hostage to various kinds of political speculations and fabrications that are rooted neither in theory nor practice.
In contrast, the damage to maritime trade, freedom of navigation, and sustainable global supply chains caused by unilateral coercive measures (UCMs) imposed by Western countries is very real indeed. These countries use this tool in violation of international law to prop up their own domination and carry out unfair competition through non-economic means. Having stable and predictable maritime logistics is important for all countries, and for small island states or coastal developing countries, this is a matter of survival. Unfortunately, we are increasingly witnessing actions designed to create artificial barriers and threats in this relation.
UCMs are inherently unlawful, and using them contravenes international law. However, states that use UCMs tend to refer to attempts to circumvent such, I repeat, completely unlawful measures when labelling vessels as belonging to the so-called “shadow fleet.” I would like to underscore that this term has no legal basis and is not backed by any transparent international mechanism. In other words, it is nothing more than arbitrariness on the part of Western countries, who are hiding their desire to maintain their dominance in the world by hook or by crook. In practice, such actions purely serve to complicate logistics and increase the cost of goods for the consumers. In the end, it is developing countries that suffer the most.
Mr. President,
When considering maritime security issues, we cannot but mention the actions of certain States aimed at escalating tensions in regions that are often located thousands of nautical miles from their own borders. They are presented as naval operations to support freedom of navigation, although in practice they are nothing but same blatant provocations.
What poses a particular threat are the frequent attempts by Western countries to encroach on fundamental maritime freedoms, including freedom of navigation and the right of peaceful passage and transit. At a meeting during the Greek UNSC Presidency in May, we recounted the outrageous actions of Estonian patrol ships that attempted to seize a tanker that was navigating in international waters. There were two attempts to land capture teams from a helicopter, and an Estonian navy boat literally tried to ram the tanker. All this was done under the same pretext of combating the so-called “shadow fleet,” which I have mentioned today and which has no basis in international law. As is well known, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea contains an exhaustive list of situations whereby it is permissible to stop a vessel flying a foreign flag for inspection. Neither this list nor the Convention as a whole contains a single mention of the so-called “shadow fleet.”
The inviolability of maritime freedoms and the principle of the flag State jurisdiction over vessels in international waters are of key importance for ensuring the stable and predictable functioning of the international maritime trade system.
In this regard, the actions of Estonia and its European backers have set a dangerous precedent. If other states follow their example, global supply chains will be disrupted and maritime trade will come to a halt. Using NATO naval forces and assets for such illegal actions is a direct path to military escalation and will create new risks for maritime security.
Mr. President,
In conclusion, I would like to touch upon what was mentioned in the concept note, namely the initiative to establish an international body for maritime security. In our view, the relevant efforts being made at the national level, as well as through existing regional and international organizations, are quite effective and sufficient. We urge everyone to focus on improving them where necessary and not to complicate the context for the implementation thereof, including through the unlawful measures I mentioned.
Thank you.
