Statement by Deputy Permanent Representative Alexander Repkin at a UNSC Briefing on Artificial Intelligence and International Security
Mr. President,
We thank the briefers for their contributions to the discussion.
Today, artificial intelligence has become quite a hot topic. There’s hardly anyone in the world who is indifferent to it. It has become a subject matter at various political and expert platforms.
The Security Council is no exception. However, this statutory body of the United Nations has clear limitations. First, it is difficult to see how the artificial intelligence in general is related to the Security Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security, which is clearly defined in the UN Charter. Second, and just as important. The countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America are under-represented in the Council. The voice of the Global South is unlikely to be heard in full. Consequently, there is a high risk that the dominant group of Western States in the Council, which is interested in preserving and consolidating its technological leadership in this sphere, will seek to impose its narrow self-serving approach on the entire international community, to the detriment of the prerogatives of inclusive, specialized mechanisms that are engaged in practical work in this field. Unfortunately, we already see it happening. Among these most striking examples are the closed-door summits on the “responsible use of AI for military purposes,” to which most developing countries are not invited.
Finally, the issues of both civilian and military applications of the AI technologies are complex and multifaceted. That is precisely why these issues should be discussed in specialized fora. For example, it would be appropriate to hold discussions on cyberattacks carried out with the use of the artificial intelligence at the Global Mechanism, which was established to replace the specialized Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies
For the consideration of the military aspects of AI application, there is the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems operates which operates within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
We would like to draw our colleagues’ attention to the fact that the specialized Group of Governmental Experts in Geneva adopted a substantive consensus report three weeks ago. This result is a practical confirmation of the effectiveness and relevance of this forum. The most important thing is that the report contains a working definition of autonomous weapon systems (AWCs), a common understandings of the application of international law—including international humanitarian law—to them, as well as parameters for ensuring human oversight to mitigate the risks associated with the use of AI for military purposes. We deem it counterproductive to undermine the constructive work that has been accomplished at the Geneva platform. For our part, we stand ready to continue participating actively in the Group’s activities to further coordinate common approaches in this sphere.
Mr. President,
We have carefully reviewed the concept note for today’s meeting presented by the French presidency. We deem it counterproductive to consider the use of AI technologies solely through the lens of risks. After all, there are always two sides to every coin. The advantages of the AI include reliability, security, and, above all, speed, including in decision-making. The AI allows to carry out the effective analysis of large datasets, helps identify threats, enhances situational awareness and operational accuracy, as well contributes to reducing risks for the civilian population and strengthening the protection of civilian infrastructure.
At the same time, it is indeed important to bear in mind that this technology also involves risks. Ensuring human control of AI-powered technologies is the primary means of minimizing these risks. Its specific forms are determined by States, in practice, at the national level. Among the possible means to ensure human control are, for example, enhancing the system’s reliability and fault tolerance; reducing the types of targets; imposing restrictions on the duration of operation, geographic coverage, and scope of application; as well as timely intervention and deactivation of the system.
In addition, States should take steps to identify and minimize errors in algorithms and datasets, as well as adopt appropriate measures to prevent and suppress violations of international law in the context of the development and use of these technologies. Such possible measures could include effective life cycle management of weapons systems and military equipment, establishing readiness criteria, and ensuring maximum protection against unauthorized access.
We also see added value in exchanging views and agreeing on specific recommendations and guidelines. However, it is important to do so exclusively at specialized platforms.
In principle, Russia has no objections to a multilateral dialogue on the use of the AI, including in the military sphere, and to examining the implications of the use of such technologies for international peace and security. At the same time, we are convinced that such a dialogue must be based on consensus and inclusivity and take place at an intergovernmental level. These fundamental principles are aimed at ensuring that the interests of every Member State are taken into account and the decisions that are made are effective. Moreover, when exchanging views on this topic, a particular focus must be placed on ensuring non-discriminatory and equitable access to AI technologies for all States, especially those in the Global South.
Thank you.
