Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

Remarks to the press by Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, following the UN Security Council consultations on the situation in Syria

April 13, 2016


V.Churkin: Today at the consultations of the Security Council Russia and China introduced a joint draft Security Council resolution which is aimed at strengthening our hand in the fight against terrorism. Particularly against the threat of terrorists using chemical weapons. Recently we’ve had numerous reports of terrorist groups in Syria and neighboring Iraq using chemical weapons - just a few days ago there was a report out of Deir ez-Zor and then a recent report out of Aleppo when terrorists used chemical weapons and actually admitted that use. Also there are numerous reports which indicate that terrorists may be in the process of preparing, building chemical weapons and preparing for their use. As we were looking with great concern at those developments we realized that there is a certain missing link in the documents which have so far been adopted by the Security Council on the issue of the use of chemical weapons by terrorists.

You remember that there was resolution 2118, very important one. In accordance with which the entire Syrian chemical arsenal was destroyed. In that resolution there is a provision that State Members, everybody, should report to the Security Council indications that non-state actors possess chemical weapons. Unfortunately that provision of resolution 2118 has not been operational – we’ve received no reports of this sort (from Member States) despite numerous reports coming from other sources. Then the Security Council supported the decision of the Director General of OPCW to organize a fact finding mission - an instrument which allows OPCW to investigate reports of chemical weapons use in Syria and determine whether in fact such uses have taken place. They’ve come up with the determination that in several cases most likely chemical weapons have been used. Then because we also felt that more needs to be done we adopted a resolution on the creation of Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), a joint OPCW-UN mechanism, which is supposed to go a step further and actually establish, determine who might have been behind those uses of chemical weapons. As we’ve been looking at how all these mechanisms work we realized that there is a loophole or a missing link - we don’t do any work on the possibility of terrorists actually preparing to build a chemical weapon. Despite all those numerous media reports and various accounts nothing is being received in that regard by Fact-Finding Mission or Joint Investigate Mechanism or by the Security Council. So the draft resolution which China and Russia have jointly prepared is a fairly simple one – it is filling this gap which we have detected, it reiterates once again that Member States, in particular Member States neighboring the Syrian Arab Republic, should immediately report any actions by non-state actors to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use chemical weapons and their means of delivery to the Security Council and to OPCW-UN JIM (Joint Investigative Mechanism) and also it asks the OPCW-UN JIM to monitor those activities within available limits. It may seem as a limited step but we believe that this step is necessary and it may serve as a deterrent if terrorists plan to use chemical weapons and in our experience they sometimes have used chemical weapons trying to blame the Syrian government for that. Our hope is that if they know that we are monitoring their activity, their incentive to use chemical weapons in the hope that the responsibility for that can be shifted elsewhere - the chances of them trying to do that will diminish. So our proposal has been discussed as initial reaction by some Security Council members. Some of them have indicated to us that maybe this measure is not broad enough and in fact it is not. We think it is a global issue. Some indicated that a broader issue needs to be addressed when the review of resolution 1540 will take place by the end of the year. But we think we cannot wait. 1540 will come months later. If during the review of 1540 we determine that more can be done, then definitely Russia and, I know, China will be pleased to do that. But this is something we can do very quickly and strengthen and fine-tune the mandate of JIM and make another step in our work against terrorism and against the possibility of the use of chemical weapons by them.

Q: The Syrian government has accused Turkey many times for hosting these preparations for the use of chemical weapons. Do you think that your draft resolution targets Turkey mainly or…?

V.Churkin: It talks about neighboring countries. We know that ISIL operates in Iraq, we know that there have been reported cases of the use of chemical weapons in Iraq, possibly terrorists are preparing. Turkey is also a neighboring country and as you know there was a troubling report that before the events in Syria (massive use of sarin in August 2013) there were terrorists who were apprehended in Turkey. Actually even the investigation started but then for some reason that investigation ended. In our view there could be a connection between this. Because we are convinced that terrorists were behind use of sarin in August of 2013. It could well be that preparation was going on the territory of Turkey. More could have been done maybe in the course of that investigation to prevent the use of sarin in August 2013. So that would apply to cases like this the way it works now. The JIM will not go back to that situation because it is looking at the more recent cases of possible use of chemical weapons. But in our view it will be a useful thing to do anyway.

Q: Ambassador, would this draft resolution include the Syrian regime that is currently reportedly uses chemical weapons?

V.Churkin: We have the entire process covered as far as the Syrian government is concerned. We know that there are suspicions that they may have been involved. Well, first of all the Syrian government has destroyed its entire chemical arsenal. Some people are saying that they have not done that, they have not fully declared, maybe hiding something. For that there is current OPCW process of looking into it, so this side of this issue is covered. I have not heard anybody claim that the Syrian government is building new chemical weapons and I have not heard anybody claim that they are concerned that the Syrian government may use chemical weapons in a subway in a European city. All those things are happening with the terrorists. We know that they are playing with those things, building those things. We know that there is a strong concern that thousands of them have moved to Europe. Could some of them have brought with them components of chemical weapons? Could some of them have brought to a European city or European countries the knowledge of how to build chemical weapons? Obviously. This is a clear and present threat. Our proposal is not taking anything away from the system which is there in addressing whatever concern there might be with regard to the Syrian government. But it adds something to the concerns which are clearly there with regard to the use of chemical weapons by terrorists.

Q. First I want to ask about the neighboring countries of Syria. We know that there were documented incidents of use of chemical weapons in Iraq on behalf of ISIL against specifically Kurdish forces. Is it included in the resolution? Second, this move supported by Russia might seem as a distraction from what’s going on in Syria right now, from the Joint Investigative Mechanism work…

V.Churkin: It’s not. It’s a part of the core issues. How can you distract from a core issue? If, God forbid, there is a horrible scenario a month from now - a chemical weapon is brought from Syria and used in Europe or USA? And people would ask: “Why didn’t you do anything about this?” – “Because we thought it would be a distraction!” This is one of the greatest threats. Since we have identified a certain gap in our current system, in our efforts, we need to fill in this gap. This is as simple as that. It’s not distracting from anything.

Technically speaking it’s not going outside of the territory of Syria. It is focused on Syria and surrounding countries. Some time ago we suggested that the JIM should also extend its activity to Iraq. The Government of Iraq said that they were going to handle it themselves in cooperation with OPCW (and this is very good). But we know that ISIL does not recognize the border between Syria and Iraq. They go back and forth. So we need to involve this ISIL territory without intruding into the sovereign rights of the Iraqi government which, we hope, will be cooperative with this proposal.

Q. And also is there any reporting mechanisms from the Secretary-General?

V.Churkin: There is a reporting mechanism. What we suggest: “The Secretary-General will report on the implementation of this resolution through his monthly progress reports in respect to the SC resolutions 2118 and 2235”. We’ve had a report today from Kim Won-soo and from Virginia Gamba, so if this resolution is adopted the next report of the Security Council will include this information.

Q. Did V.Gamba and the JIM request these measures and when do you think the resolution might be adopted?

V.Churkin: What she said in the consultations properly and very courageously is that the SC determines their mandate. They will have to do what their mandate provides for. But our initiative did come out of our conversations with Ms.Gamba, the JIM and the Secretariat so it’s not coming out of nowhere. Our draft resolution says the JIM shall monitor these activities within available resources. So this is something you need to discuss with them. I don’t think we are asking too much. And we’ll see what can be done realistically. For example. If there is a report that terrorists are preparing to use chemical weapons in some places in Iraq, is it possible for them to write a letter to the Government of Iraq and ask them: what do you think about this report? Is it a credible report? Is it something we need to be concerned about? Is there something we need to bring to the attention of the UN SC? We are not asking to send special forces and infiltrate terrorist groups. It is just a first step in enhancing our work in combating chemicals.

Q. Does it cover Syria and Iraq?

V.Churkin: We would prefer to do more. During previous discussions there was a suggestion: why don’t we do something global? We said: fine, let’s do something global. But the review of UN SC resolution 1540 resolution will come months later. We think we cannot wait. So it is a limited thing. And something that should be done quickly. And there is a mechanism that can do a useful work in this regard. Are we going to do the next step? If there are good proposals for the next step – we’ll look at them. We need to understand that though terrorists can come up with those things practically anywhere the greatest threat is ISIL in Syria and Iraq where they have that serious territorial foothold, ability and space to do those things. We’ll start with the first thing and then we’ll see what we can do. Technically speaking we are not mentioning Iraq. We say “Syria and neighboring countries”. We don’t want to complicate things. But obviously the cooperation of neighboring states is going to be important. Particularly that of Iraq and Turkey.