Statement by the representative of the Russian Federation to the First Committee of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly Vladimir Yermakov in the First Committee on “Other weapons of mass destruction” cluster
Mr. Chairman,
The Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons remains one of the key international mechanisms that has demonstrated its practical efficiency. Yet another and probably the most vivid testament to that is the early completion of the Russian Federation State program of elimination of its chemical weapons.
Russia inherited the biggest arsenal of this type of WMDs and we fulfilled the task of their elimination with honor having demonstrated once again Russia’s commitment to strict compliance with its obligations under international treaties.
A number of states took part to this or that extent in the implementation of the Russian Federation State program of elimination of the chemical arsenal: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. We are grateful to all our partners for their assistance. Now that this titanic work is over we can say without exaggeration that the elimination by Russia of its chemical arsenal is a historic landmark for the entire international community. We expect that this success would be duly reflected in the resolution on the CWC at the current UN GA session.
However, one should not stop there. We call on all other countries that still possess chemical weapons to follow Russia’s example without delay. First of all, this refers to the State that initiated the CWC and has always been an active proponent of CWC ideas when it concerned other States. And now for some reasons it still remains the biggest possessor of chemical weapons.
Against this background the attempts to cast shadows on the great achievements of other States, such as Syria, cannot but cause a lot of raised eyebrows. Let us stop stretching the truth. It was the government of Syria that under the hardest circumstances of the fight against international terrorism on its territory selflessly and under strict international control had eliminated its chemical warfare potential. No other State has ever done so. Therefore, any insinuations in this regard just go beyond the limits of decency. All remaining questions related to the initial declaration should and can be addressed by OPCW in accordance with its standard operation procedures.
Russia has been persistently and consistently calling for complete and objective investigation of all chemical incidents including on the Syrian territory where the fight against international terrorism was underway. To find the truth the FFM and JIM must use all available means with compulsory on-site visits to collect samples and interview the actual witnesses rather than sham “observers” from the territory of other States. Otherwise there still would be reasonable questions and suspicions regarding the activities of these two entities that are playing directly into the hands of one, and by the way not so bright, party to the conflict on the territory of Syria.
The attempts of some countries to appoint the guilty party before the completion of the official investigation cannot but raise concerns. We regard such steps as another attempt of forceful overthrow of the legitimate power in Syria as had been already the case in Iraq and Libya. Such a policy is extremely dangerous for it undermines the efforts toward political settlement of the crisis with participation of all Syrians as it is envisaged by the UN SC resolution 2254.
The Russian initiative on the earliest launch of negotiations on a convention to suppress the acts of chemical and biological terrorism at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is becoming more relevant. It’s noteworthy that in the first ranks of “skeptics” one can find those countries that distort actual facts and throw unsubstantiated accusations against the government of Syria as if it were using chemical warfare against itself.
The elaboration of a convention to counter chemical and biological terrorism does not mean at all that efforts to strengthen the regimes of the existing mechanisms should be abandoned. First of all, this concerns the BWC.
We call upon all BWC States Parties and first of all our two depositary partners to ensure the adoption of meaningful intersessional program of work for the period of 2018-21 at the upcoming Meeting of States Parties in December. The proposals discussed at the 2016 Review Conference including Russian proposals on mobile medical and biological teams could be used as a basis for that. The attempts to undermine the BWC as it was done by our two depositary partners during the 2000 and 2016 Review Conferences must be stopped. We call upon all State Parties to work in the spirit of compromise and to take into account not only their specific national interests but also common enduring interests of international security and strategic stability.
