Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
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Statement by the representative of the Russian Federation at the 2015 session of the UN Disarmament Commission

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

The Russian Federation has been a strong advocate of a comprehensive multilateral approach to addressing disarmament issues provided that principles of strategic stability and equal and undiminished security for all are met. We reaffirm the central role of the United Nations in international efforts in ensuring global stability and in combating new challenges and threats. We are committed to a stronger and more efficient UN disarmament machinery, including the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), as part and parcel of this mechanism.

No doubt, the UNDC should deliver on its mandate. The goal of making recommendations on various problems in the field of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation set before the UNDC by the first UNGA special session on disarmament almost forty years ago is still relevant. From our perspective, the UNDC solid expertise and its long experience are more than ever in demand to address pressing issues of international security and global stability.

We should not deceive ourselves – those obstacles that hinder effective functioning of other elements of the UN disarmament “triad” are intrinsic to the UNDC as well. First of all, we refer to the lack of political will of states to mutually respect the differences in their priorities.

We are willing to consider any ideas to enhance the UNDC effectiveness but with the main criterion in mind – the “do not harm” principle. The Commission has a vast experience of productive work on the basis of the current Rules of Procedure and with the principle of consensus at its core. This principle is a fundamental one for negotiations in the field of multilateral arms control. Departure from the principle of consensus would be fraught with harmful consequences for international security.

We believe that at the current session we should primarily focus on adopting a high-quality agenda that would serve as a basis for our work within the next three years. In our opinion, there is room for compromise on the content of the agenda. While preparing for the session we made some suggestions on the agenda. And we are ready to consider ideas of other states. It is crucial that we finish discussions on this issue as soon as possible and get down to substantive work. 

In three week time a regular Review Conference of the NPT Parties (the 2015 NPT RevCon), perhaps, the most important event in our field, will open. We consider the NPT as the foundation for the global regime of nuclear non-proliferation and international security. One of the main goals of the NPT Parties at the RevCon is to reaffirm their commitment to the objectives of and the obligations under the Treaty as well as to the strengthening of the Treaty based on the long-term 2010 Action Plan which is still relevant. All the provisions of the Plan adopted by consensus and based on the balance between three NPT pillars (non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy) should be implemented. We hope that the RevCon will also succeed in working out new decisions as a follow-up to the Action Plan. 

There is a great concern regarding lack of progress in implementing the decision of the 2010 NPT RevCon to convene a Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (WMDFZ). Despite considerable efforts undertaken, inter alia, by Russia this important event did not take place in the fixed timeframe. Nevertheless, the goal of establishing the WMDFZ is still on the international agenda, and we consider it important to continue the dialogue with the countries of the region to convene the Conference without delay. An unprecedented process to find the solution to this issue was launched. The mere fact that all its parties gathered at the negotiating table was a significant progress. It is important to preserve this experience and to use it for further work on this track.

We stand for further expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones that, undoubtedly, draws us closer to the world free of nuclear weapons. The signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by the nuclear powers in May 2014 became an important contribution to this process. The internal ratification procedures of this Protocol are at the final stage in Russia. We also count on the early finalization of legal procedures of establishing the NWFZ in Southeast Asia. We have completed the national procedures which allow us to sign the relevant Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty.

The build-up of the multilateral cooperation under the UNSC resolution 1540 and such mechanisms as Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism remains a critical issue. The same is true for the multilateral export control regimes to prevent nuclear materials and appropriate technologies from falling into the hands of non-state actors, and of terrorists in the first place.

One of the major priorities of the international community is to rid the world of the threat caused by WMD, including nuclear weapons. Russia has been actively working on this track, undertaking specific steps to limit and reduce its nuclear arsenal, significantly cut for the last quarter of the century. The process will continue under the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. In accordance with the Treaty the Russian strategic arsenal will be limited to 1550 nuclear warheads on 700 deployed launchers by the beginning of 2018. We have been actively implementing this task.

As President Vladimir Putin confirmed, we are ready for the most serious substantive dialogue on nuclear disarmament, but only serious one, without double standards. Particularly, it is essential to take into account the capabilities of high-precision non-nuclear weapons. It is necessary to avoid the situation, when the evident military advantage is gained by the countries leading in development and production of such systems which are augmented by the means of ballistic missile defense. This situation is fraught with destruction of strategic parity and global destabilization of international situation in general.

We assume that advancement towards nuclear-free world is impossible without ensuring appropriate international conditions that would let reduce and limit nuclear armaments while strengthening strategic stability and providing equal and undiminished security for all. This very route is envisaged in the decisions adopted in the NPT framework.

Unilateral and unconstrained deployment of the US global missile defense remains one of the extremely destructive factors. The US missile defense plans are being realized under the far-fetched pretexts and to the detriment of the security of other states gravely complicating international relations not only in Euro-Atlantic zone, but in the Asian-Pacific region as well. Accelerated deployment of the US missile defense becomes a serious obstacle on the way towards further nuclear disarmament and creates dangerous prerequisites for the resumption of a nuclear arms race. It is possible to change this situation only if the states that pursue the development of anti-missile capabilities in deeds rather than words would follow universal principle, agreed upon within the framework of the OSCE, saying, that attempts by one state to strengthen its national security at the expense of the security of other states are unacceptable. Strict compliance with this rule should become the starting point in seeking mutually acceptable outcomes on any issue of international security.

We are also deeply concerned that since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was open for signature almost 20 years ago its entry into force is suspended for an indefinite period. A voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, despite its importance, can not be substituted by a treaty obligation. It is essential that all nuclear states, without exception, ratify the CTBT. Russia did it back in 2000. We call upon all states that signed or ratified the CTBT to keep implementing its basic provisions.

Another negative factor affecting strategic stability is the unwillingness of some states to abandon the opportunity of placing weapons in outer space and taking steps to prevent an arms race in outer space, in particular, to contribute to an appropriate legally binding international agreement. The Russia-China draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) could serve as a basis for such an agreement. Its updated version, which is under consideration at the Conference on Disarmament, has the support of all responsible states.

Globalization of the Russian initiative/political commitment of not to be the first to place weapons in outer space (NFP) is considered as an important intermediate measure on the way towards PPWT. All the State Parties to the Collective Security Treaty Organization as well as Brazil, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Argentina and Cuba have already officially joined our initiative. A growing number of states are ready to follow this praiseworthy example. For the first time the current UNGA session has adopted the NFP resolution with 34 co-sponsors. The voting showcased that our initiative has an overwhelming support of the international community. The states that at that time were compelled to abstain from the support of the NFP resolution clearly demonstrated but their inability to express national opinion as well as their dependence on the states that are harboring plans for the first placement of weapons in outer space and.

The multilateral cooperation on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (TCBMs) and their introduction into the international practice remains a promising track. The pilot debate on this issue on the basis of the Russian discussion paper on increasing transparency and confidence-building measures in the sphere of conventional arms with the emphasis on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space took place at the UNDC last session.

We call upon all states to take active part in the joint ad-hoc meeting of the 70^th UNGA First and Fourth Committees dedicated to TCBMs.

As to further steps in nuclear disarmament, it is important that all Nuclear-Weapon States should join this process. With the New START Russia and the USA reached the stage when it is already impossible to disregard potentials of third countries. Evidently, this goal will require appropriate multilateral political and regulatory framework. Of course, we welcome unilateral measures of certain states on the reduction of their nuclear arsenals, but we cannot help but take into account that such measures are not fixed in any legal form, they are not verifiable and can be revoked in any moment.

Regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons, we would like to recall that under the so-called Presidential initiatives of 1991-1992 Russia had reduced its arsenal of such weapons by three quarters, converted it into the category of non-deployed weapons and concentrated it in central storage facilities within the national territory. This is an unprecedented unilateral measure of nuclear de-alerting. It remains in force even despite the fact that the US nuclear weapons are still operationally deployed on the territory of the European NATO States, in close proximity to us, and remain targeted at Russia with the capability to reach the Russian territory within short period of time. Moreover, the USA is currently upgrading such weapons. And some European non-nuclear States are actively involved in so-called “nuclear sharing” missions. The nuclear weapon use drills with the direct involvement of “non-nuclear” NATO States, as endorsed by the decisions of the last year NATO summit in Wales, seem to be particularly cynical this year as we all will commemorate with sorrow the 70^th anniversary of the use of the US nuclear weapons against civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Besides, one should not forget that such activities constitute a flagrant violation of the first two fundamental articles of the NPT.

On March 26 we all celebrated the 40^th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The Convention was the first international treaty to ban an entire category of WMD. Meanwhile, the BWC is a product of its time and under the current circumstances it has some serious shortcomings, the main of which is a lack of a mechanism for compliance control. We intend to continue international discussions on the issue of strengthening the Convention so as to find practical decisions in November, 2016, at the VIII BWC Review Conference. We call upon those BWC State Parties that still maintain reservations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which is the only international instrument directly banning the use of biological weapons, to withdraw such reservations as soon as possible.

One of the recent most positive moments is an unprecedented operation on the chemical weapons elimination. The removal of all chemical weapons components from Syria last summer followed by their destruction was made possible due to the strong political will of the Syrian government as well as decisive political and in-kind contribution by Russia and, certainly, thanks to the well-coordinated efforts of the UN, the OPCW and many States concerned.

Given the current circumstances, we believe that further work on Syrian chemical dossier should be conducted under the auspices of the OPCW on a routine basis. Since it joined the CWC, Damascus keeps demonstrating an unequivocal transparency and cooperation. This fact was reflected in the UN and OPCW documents many times. 

The issue of conventional weapons is a subject for detailed consideration at the UNDC sessions. Therefore, we would like to note that it was a procedural, rather than political move by Russia to suspend its participation in the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). When we decided to suspend the operation of the CFE Treaty in 2007, we made a temporary exception for JCG as a potential venue for a dialogue. Yet our expectations have not been met. This step should not be interpreted as a rejection of further talk on Conventional Arms Control in Europe (CACE). We are fully determined to discuss a new, less costly CACE regime, which would be well-considered, well-balanced and respectful of security interests of all States without exception, if and when our partners are ready for such a dialogue.

Since the issue of conventional arms in Europe is not resolved yet and the Western countries have suspended military-related cooperation with Russia, it is rather problematic to conceive of further development of the confidence-building and security measures (CBSMs) contained in the Vienna Document. We think that now it is important to focus primarily on unconditional compliance with the CBSMs already agreed upon.

Excessive build-up of conventional arms in some States and regions exacerbates the risks of new armed conflicts. In this regard we see the main goal of multilateral transparency mechanisms in a timely detection of destabilizing build-up of arms and in creation of opportunities for a dialogue between States with the aim to lift such concerns.

We believe that it is necessary to take concrete and effective measures to prevent illegal trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Such measures should include a universal ban on transfer of SALW to non-state actors, a stronger control on arms re-export, a campaign against illegal brokering, permanent verification by exporter of SALW of storage conditions and its end use by importer. All these measures would lower the risk of SALW falling into the hands of illegal armed forces or terrorist groups. We should always bear in mind that our main task is to prevent the use of SALW as a tool for violating fundamental human rights and destabilizing civil society.

Mr. Chairman,

Even this brief overview of the most urgent tasks in the realm of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation proves the need for our dialogue at the UNDC session. This dialogue should build upon the current mandate and the unanimously acknowledged principle of consensus providing for optimal results. So, we suggest focusing on the intensive search for appropriate responses to pressing issues instead of “re-inventing the wheel” and creating some “new formats”. Efficiency of the UNDC depends rather on real contribution of every state than on some ephemeral transformations of this forum. Let us be frank: the situation at the UNDC is a direct reflection of how efficiently we act within its framework.

I would like to assure you that at this session the Russian delegation is ready to co-operate with other delegations in order to work out mutually acceptable approaches.